The Postwar Period 183
Toward the end of the letter he developed this thought further, emphasiz-
ing that the experience of every country forging a “new democracy,” where
communists were in power, should be seen as a continuation of the October
Revolution: something new in the revolutionary praxis of communism, but also
perfectly in tune with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. In this dynamic vision
of socialist evolution, he assigned to the Soviet Union the responsibility to sup-
port those countries that were ideologically aligned with it, rather than med-
dling in their internal affairs. Only in this way could the revolution spread
throughout the world.^178
These were not new ideas for Tito: he had already expressed them at the
1945 Founding Congress of the Serbian Communist Party. On that occasion,
he had said that in Yugoslavia the phases of bourgeois and socialist revolution
were not clearly defined, and that the country would evolve toward socialism
differently than the Soviet Union had. He also revealed that he had personally
spoken about this with Stalin, and received assurances that it did not contradict
Lenin’s teachings. In 1948, however, this belief seemed so daring that it was
refuted by Kardelj, Ranković, Kidrič, and Djilas—the faithful four whom Tito
had summoned to Zagreb. On their arrival, they read both Stalin’s letter and
Tito’s, concluding that the latter was too provocative and likely to cause further
irritation. Djilas was the first to articulate his reservations, which were echoed
by the others. Tito accepted them without opposition, though half-heartedly.
He knew that he could not afford to bite off more than he could chew and
isolate himself from his comrades: for the moment, it was essential to preserve
the unity of the leadership. Although Stalin had not attacked him personally—
nor would he do so later—it was clear that his position was vulnerable. When
Djilas offered him his resignation, along with the other “dubious Marxists,”
Tito refused it without hesitation, even irritably: “Oh no! I know what they
want—to destroy our Central Committee. You first, and then me!”^179
It was decided that Tito’s reply to Stalin should be approved by the plenum
of the CC, which had last been convened in October 1940. Stalin’s reproaches
about the lack of democracy in the CPY had hit their mark. For the same rea-
son, Tito also proposed that the Fifth Congress of the party be organized, since
the last one had happened back in 1929. This self-correction was necessary
both to mobilize the party and to show Stalin that the leadership was ready to
accept his criticisms, where justified. Tito did not believe that such measures
would appease Stalin, but his comrades thought otherwise: only Kardelj, per-
haps, was able to see the reality of the situation. Although he continued to
recognize Stalin as the supreme leader of the revolution, and felt the need to
disagree with him was a personal tragedy, he was under no illusions. On the
return journey to Belgrade, he told his comrades that relations with the Soviet