The Presidential Years 319
was inadvertently aided by an article that had appeared in Pravda on 10 Feb ru ary
of that year, which spoke about Yugoslav orthodoxy in such a panegyric way as to
provoke worried conjectures as to its hidden significance among many in Bel-
grade. Did it imply that the LCY was returning to the fold? Without omitting
that there were some leaders in the LCY who opposed Tito, thus departing from
the “class positions of Marxism-Leninism,” the CPSU organ stood up for Yugo-
slavia against Chinese attacks, stressing its closeness with the Soviet system.^282
That pronouncement sounded more like an official declaration than a mere
newspaper editorial, particularly because it ended with the appeal, “Proletarians
of all countries, unite!” This was a phrase used by the Soviets in important docu-
ments. Although the Yugoslav correspondents in Moscow noticed this, in their
reports they stressed only those passages that were palatable to the Yugoslav
public. This renewed friendship with the Soviet Union was, according to them,
completely in harmony with the non-aligned policy and self-management. The
truth was otherwise, since the text in its entirety supported Khrushchev’s stance
about the unity of the “socialist camp.”^283 Political commentator Slobodan
Stanković, who was also the Yugoslav expert at Radio Free Europe, dedicated a
detailed analysis to these events, in which he wondered whether the Pravda
statements could not be seen as a proof of Tito’s estrangement from his “par-
ticular path to socialism,” from non-alignment and friendship with the West.
He took comfort, however, stressing that all was not lost since there were still
politicians in Yugoslavia who were opposed to a close understanding with
Moscow.^284 He was right. At the beginning of 1963, as Koča Popović wrote in his
diary, suspicions among the top level of Yugoslav politicians were awoken about
a possible “parallel policy” developed by Ranković, which induced the Execu-
tive Committee of the LCY to dedicate their first session to that question.
Referring to the Kiev speech, Stane Kavčič affirmed that in that period “Com-
rade Marko was a follower of a Soviet-type socialism,” declaring contentiously
that “Yugoslavia could not exist without a Scandinavian-style socialism.”^285
Even more decisive was the attitude of some Serb leaders who were beginning
to have doubts about Ranković’s succession after Tito’s retirement. Even the
conservative Petar Stam bolić maintained that “in Serbia we saw him as a con-
siderable burden. I remember a conversation with Milentije Popović in 1963.
We both agreed that it would be disgraceful if Ranković should take Tito’s
place. It has to be remembered that, in that period, everything was linked to
the Russians, and we were very afraid we might once more be absorbed into
their bloc.... It is necessary to frame the Ranković case in this context.”^286
These considerations remained limited to the power elite, but strengthened
those who worried about conservative tendencies and wanted to oppose them.
This increasingly hostile climate, which continued to build did not inspire