330 The Presidential Years
Kardelj was not directly involved in the plot, since he had withdrawn to
Slovenia for “health reasons.”^351 This does not mean he did not know about it
or that he disapproved of it. Some months after Ranković’s fall, he confided in
the American political scientist Fred Werner Neal that the Executive Commit-
tee had acted against “Comrade Marko” as a body, adding that the UDBA
agents had developed a feverish workload in the months prior. With intercep-
tions, recordings of conversations, and even open threats, they tried to convince
high officials to boycott the reform, especially the rule about the “rotation”
introduced by the Eighth Congress. According to this measure, decided on to
prevent the creation of “baronies,” no official could occupy the same post for
more than two years. The system would begin with the elections to be held in
May 1967, in view of which a special commission for the identification of can-
didates already existed. After the elections a radical administrative turnover
would take place—about thirty thousand high officials would be replaced—in
part because no one could occupy both party and state posts at the same time.
Tito was exempted from these regulations, of course, but Ranković was not,
although he also was not ready to renounce the vice-presidency of the SFRY
and his appointments in the LCY.^352
Neither Kardelj nor Bakarić could accept this idea, however, and Tito cer-
tainly could not, aware as he was that the Serbs, under the leadership of a strong-
man, could impose their hegemony on the entire country.^353 In his discussion
with Neal, Kardelj was charitable toward Ranković, although it was known that
at this point they were no longer on speaking terms. He recognized that “Com-
rade Marko” was not personally responsible for the UDBA’s abuses, and blamed
the leadership itself for leaving him too long in charge of the secret police: “We
should have given him other jobs to do.”^354 Tito was less indulgent, because in
the past he had trusted him to such an extent that in 1948 he installed a direct
phone line between his residence and Ranković’s, in case of emergencies. But
now, after receiving new information about bugs in his own residence, Tito con-
vinced himself that “Marko” had plotted against him and acted accordingly.^355
Edo Brajnik, the Slovenian deputy secretary of internal affairs, started the
chain of events. At the request of the leadership of his republic, he sent a letter to
Tito on 15 June 1966 asking for the convocation of the Executive Committee with
just one item on the agenda: “The question of state security.”^356 Its members
met the next day at the marshal’s Belgrade residence, where they were informed
of the investigation by two Croat police experts whom Krajačić had secretly sent
to the capital to examine the homes of Tito and other prominent individuals.
As “Comrade Stevo” said, the two had done well in discovering, among other
things, that bugs had been installed in the private apartments of the president,
and even in his bedroom, which were connected to “Leka’s” nearby villa.^357