332 The Presidential Years
The Crvenkovski Commission concluded that the security service had done
good work, especially during the split with Stalin, but after the introduction of
self-management it was unable to resist the temptation to place itself above
society. Wanting to be “one of the key factors in the policy process,” it tried to
control not only the party and the state, but also a series of economic enterprises,
in order to direct investments. It became “more or less a monopoly of some indi-
viduals while its leader, Aleksandar Ranković (a.k.a. Marko a.k.a. Leka), acquired
a political significance similar to the CC of the LCY.”^365 The discussion of this
document in the Executive Committee moved those present to attack Ranković
because of his presumed intentions when it came to the fight for succession,
and to speak—as he said—“like gossipy women,” repeating rumors spread by
some of the wives of highly placed people stemming “from imaginary fears over
the fate of their husbands.”^366 Pepca Kardelj took a prominent role in this hos-
tile chatter. More lenient toward “Comrade Marko” was Kardelj himself. At the
end of June, he met him by chance in the elevator of the CC palace in Belgrade.
“Do you really think,” asked Ranković, “that I was taping Tito?”
“I don’t believe it. You know well, however, that Tito is obsessed with the
fear of being killed by Serbs,” Kardelj replied.
“I did not know this,” said Ranković.
“Marko, but you should know this,” reproached Kardelj.^367
At its session on 20 June 1966, the Executive Committee decided to con-
vene the Fourth Plenum on 1 July at Brioni, where the Crvenkovski Com-
mission would present its final report. The defense secretary, Ivan Gošnjak,
did not agree with this way of proceeding against Ranković; although they
were not friends, a bond existed between them because they were both hard-
liners. He thought that it was unfair to ascribe all of Yugoslavia’s problems to
Ranković alone. He proposed to Tito the forced retirement of all the “historical
cadres,” and the constitution of a new leadership. The marshal accepted the
suggestion, but later distanced himself from it.^368 Gošnjak did not give up:
on 25 June, he organized a meeting between Tito and Ranković in which the
marshal tried to convince Leka of the possibility of future collaboration. Say-
ing this—Leka later told his wife—Tito automatically put on his sunglasses to
hide his eyes. He could not, however, refrain from reproaching Marko for the
bad company with which he had lately surrounded himself—those spreading
rumors that Tito was ailing and needed drugs to go on.^369
The action attempted against Ranković was risky: the UDBA had weapons
and tanks at its disposal. Since the army and its secret service, KOS, rallied
around the marshal, Ranković did not have much leeway, even if he had wanted
to organize a coup d’état, which many who were party to the plot considered
possible. In any case, they battened down the hatches, posting guards at all