334 The Presidential Years
hostile shouts. During a break, Gošnjak took pity on him and suggested that he
leave, since he would not be able to endure the rest. But he refused, saying that
he wanted to hear what they would say about him to the end.^377
At the end of the discussion, however, he had a psychological breakdown.
He recognized his moral and political responsibility for the faults committed,
although without servility. He promised that he would oppose as well as he
were able all those who would try to turn him against the LCY, denying force-
fully that he been informed about specific UDBA machinations or that he had
plotted against Tito.^378 He told him, standing face to face, that “If at the 1962
plenum the Slovenians saved Kardelj, I am happy for the unity of the state, that
the Serbs did not save me.” And further: “It will not be difficult, Old One, to
get rid of me, but in Yugoslavia there will be a deluge after me.”^379 Tito chose
to ignore this ominous prophecy. He closed the session with relief, thanking
the members of the CC and stressing that everything went better than expected.
He even praised Ranković for his “good behavior.”^380
For the Yugoslav public, who were in the dark about party infighting, the Brioni
plenum had a shattering effect. In Slovenia the reaction was restrained, whereas
the Croats were elated, stressing that “there would be no return to the past.”^381
They saw in Ranković not just the symbol of the police dictatorship, but also as
a guardian of Serbian interests and the desire to keep Serbia as the leading
republic.^382 Serbia was shocked, the majority being convinced that they had lost
their point man at a decisive moment when the question of succession was press-
ing. The general mood was expressed three days before the Brioni plenum by
Dobrica Ćosić in a letter to the marshal in which he inquired about the reasons
for the “scandalous” case, convinced that it had anti-Serb implications. His pro-
test remained private, however, and had just one consequence: that the relations
between Tito and the famous writer were severed, pushing him to be increas-
ingly critical of the “Brioni regime.”^383 Ćosić expressed the sentiments of those
Serbs who believed in the Yugoslav ideal, provided that it coincided with the
values and interests of their nation. In this sense he was dangerous, since because
of his fame and popularity it was not considered appropriate to “liquidate” him.^384
On 14 July, the Federal Assembly examined Ranković’s request to be relieved
of his office as vice-president of the republic. Since he had applied for a twenty-
day leave “for health reasons,” the session was held in his absence. The pro-
cedure was quick, lasting just ten minutes. The president of the assembly,
Edvard Kardelj, read the resignation and, since nobody took the floor, it was
accepted. Moving on to the second point of the agenda, he announced that
thirty-six deputies had proposed Koča Popović as the new vice-president. This
motion was received with applause, although the latter had not been politically