352 The Presidential Years
were established with Italy and the ex-partners of the Balkan Pact, Turkey and
Greece (although in the latter the right-wing colonels were still in power). It
was clear that NATO would not tolerate Soviet military expansion into the
Adriatic, which undoubtedly comforted the Yugoslavs.^482
At the end of the year, the fear of possible Soviet intervention gradually
decreased. Tito commented on the NATO declaration about the “gray zones”
with aloofness, affirming that his country did not feel threatened, and was not
ready to seek shelter under the umbrella of this or that superpower.^483 At the
same time, the Yugoslav press progressively ceased attacks against the socialist
camp and more and more frequently underlined the willingness to preserve
good economic, scientific, and cultural relations. At Jajce, on the occasion of the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Second AVNOJ, Tito mentioned the Prague
events only fleetingly, revealing his intention to reopen a dialogue with Mos-
cow.^484 During a meeting with journalists, he even declared that it was necessary
“to favor collaboration” with the USSR, “in spite of different points of view.”^485
This tactical move, which was criticized in Slovenia and Belgrade in particular,
was not groundless. Tito was invited to mend fences with the Russians by Ital-
ian and French communists, but he was also motivated by economic interests:
about 30 percent of Yugoslav foreign exchange was linked to the Soviet bloc.
After having repressed the Prague Spring, the Soviets stopped the delivery of
arms that the Yugoslavs had already paid for. Following the conciliatory speech
in Jajce, an agreement was reached that increased the commercial interchange
between the two countries by 16 percent. The same happened in relations with
the satellites, which was of no little importance to Yugoslavia considering that
its products did not have an easy outlet to Western markets.^486
The Reorganization of the ArmyOn 11 February 1969, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly voted in the law on territo-
rial defense with a fast-track procedure, establishing a force that would orga-
nize guerrilla resistance in areas that the regular armed forces (228,000 men)
could not defend in case of enemy occupation. This idea of a popular defense
was formulated as early as the fifties and sixties, on the basis of the Partisan
experience, when it appeared clear that Yugoslavia could not resist the forces
of the Soviet bloc or of NATO head on.^487 This meant that, in case of war,
Yugoslavia would lose a significant part of its territory, although armed resis-
tance could be carried on in the areas occupied by enemy forces. The territorial
defense organization tried to recruit the entire population, between the ages of
seventeen and sixty-five, without distinction as to gender and without regard to
cost, which would be absorbed by all six republics and municipal administra-
tions. It was also joined by the civil defense, which was able to mobilize another