The Presidential Years 351
the Russian ambassador, Ivan A. Benediktov, handed over a diplomatic note on
30 August, in which the Soviet leaders criticized Yugoslavia for its anti-Soviet
and anti-socialist activity.^477 At that point, the army was put on red alert and a
partial mobilization was ordered. Bulwarks along the frontiers with Hungary
and Bulgaria were strengthened, and the airports were equipped to prevent
enemy planes from landing. In the cities, air raid drills began.^478
In autumn 1968, the situation deteriorated further as a result of a declaration
made by Brezhnev, who asserted that the interests of the socialist common-
wealth were more important than the sovereignty of individual countries. On
26 September, Pravda stated: “Every communist party is responsible not only
to its own people, but to all socialist countries, to the entire communist move-
ment. He who forgets this, stressing only the autonomy of the different com-
munist parties, is the prey of egotism and is estranged from his international
obligations.”^479 For the Yugoslavs, this new “doctrine” had a sinister sound: it
was obvious it was directed toward them. Even though the Soviet ambassador
affirmed in a conversation with Tito that it did not concern Yugoslavia, the
marshal was not consoled, especially because the Soviets refused his request to
make these assurances public.^480
As during his quarrel with Stalin, Tito had to seek help in the West. The
American president, Lyndon B. Johnson, spoke clearly in favor of Yugoslav
independence and integrity, dispatching the under secretary of state, Nicholas
deBelleville Katzenbach, to Belgrade. Even De Gaulle received Tito’s envoy—
after a ten day wait—and was impressed by the Yugoslav decision to resist an
eventual Soviet attack. During the conversation, the French president dozed
off for a moment, but as soon as he grasped the spirit of what was being said,
he opened his eyes and shouted, “What have you said?” The ambassador
repeated his words. “But this is fantastic... fundamental! Today Tito is the only
man in Europe able to react this way,” the old soldier exclaimed, banging his
fist on the table.^481
During a NATO ministerial meeting in mid-November 1968, a press release
was sent out warning the Soviet Union that “any Soviet intervention directly or
indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would cre-
ate an international crisis with grave consequences.” It was clear that the United
States and its allies had in mind the so-called “gray zones,” those not covered
by NATO, and were concerned over the fate of Yugoslavia, Finland, Austria,
and, in a somewhat different context, Romania as well. In harmony with the
foreign secretary, the Yugoslav press initially hailed the declaration but recanted
after some days of reflection, declaring it unwelcome and unnecessary. How-
ever, behind the scenes Tito continued to have consultations with the West,
which showed its readiness to collaborate with Yugoslavia. Military agreements