360 The Presidential Years
had asked the government to choose the most pertinent of the numerous pro-
posals.^526 The fact that the federal government discussed such an important
issue without informing Ljubljana added fuel to the controversy, as the Slove-
nians were convinced that they had been cheated. After an extraordinary ses-
sion, Kavčič and his colleagues sent a harsh letter of protest to Ribičič, asking
him to examine their request again, and expressing the intention to discuss the
issue in the Ljubljana parliament. Meanwhile voices were raised in the forty
municipal assemblies involved but also in the factories and squares, some of
them tinged with separatism.^527 “The motorway affair,” wrote Kavčič in his
diary, “was the first great revolt of those in Slovenia who wanted to continue
the economic reform, who desired more real and less postured democracy, and
the strengthening of the republic’s independence.”^528 They had no luck; because
of the violent reaction, the conflict assumed dimensions that overflowed the
limits of the controversy and became a matter of principle: what was the rela-
tionship between the republics and the federation? And to what extent could
the latter make decisions, transcending their local interests, dictated by reasons
that went beyond the economic? Ribičič, from his perspective, asserted that the
revolt of his compatriots was unacceptable because if he gave in to their pres-
sure he would have to give in to anyone who applied pressure, thus jeopardizing
economic stability. According to him, this was a “mass movement against the
federation.” Since the issue was put in these terms, Tito and Kardelj, who had
at first asked him to make concessions to Kavčič, changed their opinion so that
the so-called “order party” (those who wanted more discipline) could not accuse
them of promoting the disintegration of state unity. At a session of the LCY,
they declared the behavior of the Slovenian government unacceptable, nation-
alistic, and indicative of technocratic bureaucrats. “A democratic state unable to
oppose pressure from below,” said Kardelj, “cannot remain democratic.” He
agreed with Tito that it might be necessary to adopt anti-democratic means to
guarantee order if this practice continued.^529
The MaspokThe clash between the “old guard” and the new liberal forces that took power
in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana was essentially a fight for succession: a fight
Tito was aware of and skillfully exploited to preserve his role. Among the
young, the most bellicose were those from Zagreb, who encouraged the popular
masses to support their aspiration for greater autonomy in Croatia, motivated
by the psychological need to be rid of the discrimination felt by the Croats after
the war, because of the crimes of the Ustaša (the Serbs were convinced that the
responsibility for the Ustaša was a collective one). The Croats wanted a radical
transformation of the SFRY, which would guarantee the republics internal