World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 57
Vojvodina.^35 In it he proposed organizing the fall of the Cvetković-Maček
coalition, in order to replace it with a “truly popular government.” To explain
the need for this initiative, he drew attention to the tense situation in Yugosla-
via and to the fact that the dismemberment of the country between Italy and
Germany, under the auspices of the Yugoslav bourgeoisie, was a real danger.
“A truly popular government,” endorsed by workers and peasants, should pre-
pare an armed resistance against its Fascist neighbors and their attempts to
enslave the Yugoslav peoples.^36 Evidently Tito had become convinced that the
Russian experience of 1917 could be repeated in Yugoslavia: first there would
be a bourgeois-democratic revolution, the expression of liberally oriented mid-
dle classes. After that, power would be taken by the proletariat, or better by the
Communist Party, as its vanguard.^37
The IKKI session participants did not favor this proposal. The four lead-
ers observed that the CPY was underestimating the forces of their adversary,
and overestimating its own strength. In their opinion, Yugoslavia was not ready
for a transformation such as the one that had taken place in Russia in 1917, since
the CPY had little influence among the industrial workers and even less among
the peasants. They warned against any premature action, because propitious
domestic and international conditions were absent, and stressed that no one
should cultivate the illusion that the Red Army would come to the aid of the
proposed uprising. In this document, in which Broz was addressed as secretary
general for the first time, Pieck, Gottwald, Togliatti, and Manuilskii did not
limit themselves to warnings. In the second part of their “decision” they also
indicated the political line to be followed by the party. It should oppose the
Fascist plans regarding the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and favor those
forces that would be ready to resist foreign aggression among the popular
masses, the bourgeoisie, and the army. The decision read further: “If the Yugo-
slav State is divided into protectorates between Italy and Germany without a
military struggle, the party has to organize the masses against the betrayal of
the Yugoslav bourgeoisie and the violence of the imperialist powers.” With this
in mind, the CPY should elaborate appropriate military, political, economic,
and national programs for the different ethnic regions of the country. “The
party should use every means possible to collaborate with the petit bourgeois
opposition, and also with social-democrats, in order to broaden and strengthen
the front against the reaction, and to call the masses in defense of Yugoslav
independence.”^38
The Fifth State Conference of the CPYWhen he returned to Zagreb in March 1940, Broz decided to convene the
party congress as soon as possible. In order to organize this important event