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American Operational Art, 1917–2008
Antulio J. Echevarria II
INTRODUCTIONThis chapter traces the evolution of American operational art since the early
twentieth century. It argues that the US military brought war’s ‘first grammar’,
meaning the principles and procedures related to overthrowing an opponent by
armed force, to near perfection as evidenced by Desert Storm in 1991, Afghani-
stan in 2001–2, and the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the beginning of the
twentieth century, American operational art has centred on defeating an adver-
sary either by annihilation or by attrition. This art has not been restricted to land
operations, and is clearly evident in the history of US naval and air campaigns,
even if those services initially regarded it as unnecessary due to their perceived
ability to exert ‘direct strategic influence’. 1 The recent move towards fully
integrated joint operations has virtually reified both the art and the level, while,
at the same time, accelerating efforts to perfect war’s first grammar.
In the summer of 2003, however, US operational art encountered, or rather re-
encountered, a ‘second grammar’ of war, known variously (and rather loosely) as
insurgency, guerrilla warfare, or irregular warfare. While not entirely new, the
principles and procedures relevant to this grammar posed significant challenges
to a military organization reared on battle-centric concepts and in the process of
transforming into a leaner, faster, knowledge-based combat force. Although
significant progress has been made in countering this approach in recent years,
both in theory and in practice, it is not yet clear whether American operational
artists can become as proficient at war’s second grammar as they have at its first.
As Clausewitz wrote, ‘war has its own grammar, but not its own logic’. 2
Although his concern was to describe the relationship between war and policy,
the focus, here, is on the term grammar because of its unique ability to capture
the collective concepts, principles, and procedures germane to the conduct of war.
As such, it accords well with the classic conception of operational art, which is the
design of battles or operations as well as the conceptual and practical linking of
them into coherent campaigns to achieve victory. 3 Just as gifted writers, such as
William Shakespeare or Thomas Carlyle, could create literary classics using
English grammar, so too a competent operational artist can achieve success
while employing war’s grammar. The key, of course, is to know which grammar