General Colin Powell recommended halting the advance, and President Bush
agreed. A peace agreement was signed, but—in an oversight that was to be much
criticized later—it left Saddam Hussein in power. Iraqi forces were estimated to
have suffered 25,000–65,000 casualties, while the coalition lost less than 200
personnel. 80
The conflict did raise the question as to whether war’s first grammar might be
prosecuted more cleanly and from a distance with long-range precision targeting,
coupled with a small ground presence in the form of special-operations troops
and indigenous forces. Some pundits called this the ‘new’ American way of war,
even though precision munitions made up only a small percentage of the
ordinance used. 81 Others declared that air power was ‘America’s Asymmetric
Advantage’, and that it had the potential to revolutionize operational practice. 82
Dissenting voices, mostly from army and marine officers, argued that a well-
trained ground force was still needed to compel an adversary to accept terms.
The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 continued to emphasize the importance of war’s
first grammar and ‘decisive victory’, even though it acknowledged that the Cold
War had ended and the nature of the threat had changed. 83 It went on to say that
the principal role of the US army in the post-Cold War era was deterrence and the
ability to project power anywhere; however, it also stated that ‘the objective of the
military in war is victory over the opposing military force’. 84 Joint Vision 2010
(1996) andJoint Vision 2020(2000) were intended to lay out a joint concept for
US military forces in response to force-sizing pressures and the anticipated
demands of the future security environment. 85 They described four concepts
which were to set a course for the further modernization of US forces: dominant
manoeuvre, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional pro-
tection, all of which were to lead to the objective of full-spectrum dominance.
In contrast to this emphasis, the principal challenge for operational art in the
Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts, which came a few years later, was to roll back
aggressive parties and to provide security or safe zones so that political and
economic stability could be achieved. Once rollback was achieved, it was not
clear to what extent, if any, operational art remained relevant.
In keeping with the promise that information technologies would bring about
a general ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), the US military began to explore
ways to transform war’s first grammar. Information was hailed as the key to lifting
the ‘fog of war’. 86 A number of new (and old) theories were advanced, such as
network-centric warfare (NCW) and effects-based operations (EBO). NCW was
the idea of linking all military platforms and command structures together
through an information infrastructure, or ‘infostructure’, which would permit
rapid information sharing and greater efficiency and flexibility in mission execu-
tion. 87 EBO was, ostensibly, a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or
‘effects’ by applying the ‘full range of military and other national capabilities at
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels’. 88 EBO made rapid headway in
defence circles. Even though it had not been approved as official doctrine, it
began to appear in doctrinal publications and was being taught at defence
American Operational Art, 1917–2008 157