The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

(Tina Meador) #1

  1. Alan R. Millet, ‘Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare
    between the Wars’, inMilitary Innovation, 50–95.

  2. J. Garry Clifford, ‘World War II: Military and Diplomatic Course’, in Paul S. Boyer
    (ed.),Oxford Companion to United States History(Oxford: Oxford University Press,
    2001), 846.

  3. Martin Blumenson, ‘Kasserine Pass, 30 January–22 February 1943’, inFirst Battles,
    226–65, here 229.
    42.American Military History, 423–4.

  4. Ibid., 435.

  5. Martin Blumenson,Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945(New York:
    Morrow, 1985), 181.

  6. War Department, ‘Training Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign’, reprint of Training
    Memorandum 44, 4 August 1943, inKasserine Pass Battles: Doctrines and Lessons
    Learned, vol. II, part 3 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1993), 1.

  7. Major General E. N. Harmon, Cdr. 2nd Armored Division, ‘Notes on Combat
    Experience during the Tunisian and African Campaigns< 1943 >’, in ibid., 3; see also
    Russell A. Hart,How the Allies Won in Normandy(Norman, OK: University of
    Oklahoma Press, 2004), 281.

  8. George F. Botjer,Sideshow War: The Italian Campaign, 1943–45(College Station, TX:
    Texas A&M University Press, 1996); Dominick Graham,Tug of War: The Battle for
    Italy, 1943–1945(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

  9. John Keegan,Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris(New
    York: Penguin, 1994).

  10. Russell F. Weigley, ‘Normandy to Falaise: A Critique of Allied Operational Planning in
    1944’, inHistorical Perspectives, 393–414.

  11. Herwig, ‘Innovation Ignored’, 253.

  12. Richard J. Overy,The Air War, 1939–1945(Washington, DC: Potomac, 2005);Why the
    Allies Won(New York: Norton, 1997).

  13. United States Strategic Bombing Survey,Summary Report(European War), 30 Sep-
    tember 1945;Summary Report(Pacific War), 1 July 1946.
    53.American Military History, 540–2.

  14. Roy K. Flint, ‘Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5–19
    July 1950’, inFirst Battles, 265–99.

  15. Col. (ret.) Stanlis D. Milkowski, ‘After Inch’on: MacArthur’s 1950 Campaign in North
    Korea’, inHistorical Perspectives, 415–38.

  16. D. Clayton James and Anne Sharp Wells,Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis
    in Korea, 1950–1953(New York: Free Press, 1993).

  17. Russell F. Weigley,The American Way of War: A History of United States Military
    Strategy and Policy(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 382.

  18. Andrew Krepenevich, Jr.,The Army and Vietnam(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
    University Press, 1986).

  19. ‘Armed Forces; Fighting Brush Fires,’Time, 29 September, 1961;http://www.time.
    com
    (accessed 21 November 21 2009).

  20. George C. Herring, ‘Vietnam War’, inUnited States History, 807.

  21. George C. Herring,America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975
    (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).

  22. George C. Herring, ‘The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 18 October–24 Novem-
    ber 1965’, inFirst Battles, 300–26.

  23. Herring,America’s Longest War.


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