on the other fronts or battle zones. A few examples will demonstrate the effect
that a concentration of forces had on the force ratios at the operational level.
In the War of Independence, during Operation Yoav in the autumn of 1948 and
the decisive Operation Horev in December 1948–January 1949, both against
Egypt—the strongest link in the Arab coalition—the force ratios were 1:1 thanks
to the concentration of forces, while in Operation Hiram in the autumn of 1948,
on the weaker Lebanese Front, IDF forces enjoyed a quantitative edge of 1.3:1
over Kaukji’s liberation army, again thanks to a concentration of forces.
In the Six Day War, which was also waged against an Arab coalition, the IDF
compensated for its general quantitative inferiority by a sequential concentration
of forces. On the Egyptian Front, the inferiority of 1:2.3 was balanced by air
superiority, whereas on the remaining fronts the IDF enjoyed a quantitative
equality, after having shifted forces from one front to another. In a calculated
risk, which proved to be one of the principal reasons for its success in the 1967
war, Israel concentrated all of its combat-aircraft power during the initial stages of
the war on the Egyptian Front for the aerial first strike, leaving almost no aircraft
for the protection of the Israeli rear and the other fronts. The subsequent
destruction of Arab air power served the war effort on the ground, making
manoeuvre, offence, and blitzkrieg possible.
Against a single enemy and a single front, which was the case in 1956 thanks to
Jordan’s and Syria’s defection from their coalition with Egypt, 19 the IDF enjoyed a
superiority in force ratios, allowing itself initially to disperse its forces with the
aim of concentrating them later on, once the weaker points in the enemy
deployment had been identified. The deliberate dispersion of forces as a tempo-
rary step in order to force the enemy to disperse as well, since it cannot be certain
where the adversary’s main effort will be made, is compatible with the spirit of the
indirect approach and can be found in both Jomini’s and Liddell Hart’s recipes. 20
It is true, however, that such a modus operandi is often a luxury reserved for
those enjoying quantitative superiority and is typical of mountainous-terrain
warfare, which Israel employed in 1967 on the Northern Front (see below).
Interestingly, at the strategic level, the IDF tended to adopt a Clausewitzian
logic, whereby it is only the defeat of the stronger link in the enemy’s chain that
could ensure its defeat in the entire war. Such logic was implemented by the IDF
in 1948–9, when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion instructed the concentration
of as many forces as possible on the Egyptian Front during Operations Yoav and
Horev, standing firm against objections by senior commanders, such as the chief
of operations and acting chief of staff Yigael Yadin, who were reluctant to leave
only a small force on the Jordanian Front lest the Jordanians and the Iraqis should
decide to attack Israel while most of its forces were assembled against the
Egyptians. 21
In 1967, Egypt was chosen to be the first target for attack, as the Israeli high
command believed that defeating it would significantly weaken the Arab war
coalition and bring about its collapse. A concentration of forces was also
implemented on each of the battlefronts. On the Egyptian Front, the main effort
was built at the northern axis of the Sinai Peninsula, and on the Jordanian Front it
174 The Evolution of Operational Art