was built in Samaria. On the Northern Front, where the IDF had to overcome
Syrian fortifications located in steep mountainous terrain, Israel started its
offensive with a broad-front attack—advancing along five different axes simulta-
neously—which is compatible with the ‘logic of the many’ and mountainous-
terrain warfare. Having identified two weak points in the Syrian deployment—at
the northern and central axes—the IDF concentrated its force against them.
Attacking sequentially was possible in 1967 thanks to the IDF’s blitzkrieg cap-
abilities, which quickly enabled a battlefield decision on each front, and the
concentration of air power.
Another difference between concentrating forces against a coalition as opposed
to a single enemy in the Israeli case pertained to the force-concentration aspect of
operating on interior or exterior lines. When fighting against a single enemy at
the strategic level, the IDF preferred operating on exterior lines, as evidenced in
1956 and partly in 1982. Multi-enemy and multi-front conditions, on the other
hand, imposed fighting on interior lines strategically, but allowed operating on
exterior lines at the lower operational and tactical levels, as was demonstrated in
1948–9, for example, in Operations Hiram and Horev, and in 1967.
If, until the Six Day War, Israel’s interior lines were short and as such could
contribute to the quick transfer of forces from one front to another, after having
captured the territories Israeli interior lines became much longer, negatively
affecting the IDF’s ability to enjoy its advantages, as was proved in the 1973
October War.
First strike
The idea of a first strike shares the same spirit as Sun Tzu’s notion of attacking the
enemy’s war plans or strategy as a centre of gravity, 22 except that Sun Tzu thought
of disrupting the enemy’s war effort by non-military actions, whereas, in the
Israeli case, disruption was to be achieved via actual use of force, preferably
by launching a first strike in the form of either prevention (as in 1956) or pre-
emption (1967). Although delivering a first strike has never been an explicit
principle in Israeli war doctrine, Israelis have always believed that striking first, if
only possible with the backing of a great power or a superpower, might have an
irreversible effect on the enemy. And, indeed, both in 1956 and in 1967, the first
strike had a considerable negative effect on the Arab war effort.
In 1956, the initial stages of the Israeli ground first strike were disguised as a
reprisal operation, in order to enable the withdrawal from the Sinai without
losing face should France and Britain fail to live up to their commitment to join
the war. But once they did join, their aerial first strike on Egypt had a great impact
on Israeli ground operations, creating favourable conditions for achieving a quick
battlefield decision on the ground. In 1967, the IAF’s first strike (code-named
Operation Moked) destroyed the Arab air forces on the ground. Some 450 aircraft
were destroyed within hours. The Israeli attack was launched in the morning, at a
perfect time—when the commander of the Egyptian army, Field Marshall Abd al-
Hakim Amer, and other senior Egyptian commanders were on their way to visit
The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art, 1948–2008 175