rear). 23 The distinction between the two is not hard and fast; however, perhaps
the simplest way to differentiate betweenzhengandqiis that the latter invariably
contains the element of surprise or psychological warfare, while the former
involves more straightforward kinetic warfare. The presumption of Chinese
strategists is that, for a commander to emerge victorious, he must skilfully
combine orthodox and unorthodox methods. Sun Zi says inThe Art of War
(chapter 5): ‘In warfare the strategic configurations of power...do not exceed the
unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can
never be completely exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce
each other just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?’ 24 Indeed, one
cannot exist without the other: thus, for example, exclusive reliance on the
unorthodox would render one’s methods orthodox.
Those who believe that China possesses a unique strategic tradition will tend to
emphasize the unorthodox elements found in Chinese operational art, while those
who believe China’s strategic tradition is consistent with those of other states will
tend to stress the orthodox elements. Here, it is worth making an obvious but
important point—standard operational art around the globe is focused essentially
on the same goal: wiping out the enemy while doing one’s utmost to preserve one’s
own forces. Mao observed this in May 1938: ‘All the guiding principles of military
operations grow out of the one basic principle: to strive to the utmost to preserve
one’s own strength and destroy that of the enemy’. 25 This operational priority is
discernible not only in the writings of Mao and Sun Zi, but also in non-Chinese
theorists, such as Clausewitz and Jomini. 26
One of the most famous cases of the successful use of unorthodox methods in
Chinese military history, narrated in theRomance of the Three Kingdoms(chapter
95), involves Zhuge Liang—widely regarded in contemporary China as the great-
est strategist of the pre-modern era. It is known as the ‘empty fortress (or city)’
stratagem. According to the story, the hero finds himself in a city commanding a
token garrison with the majority of the state’s armed forces elsewhere as a vastly
superior enemy force rapidly approaches. Zhuge Liang feigns confidence and
strength: he orders the gates of the city to be thrown open and his small
contingent of soldiers to keep out of view. With this accomplished, he positions
himself on the ramparts in full view of the invading force and calmly plays a
traditional Chinese musical instrument. The invading generals are suspicious of
the seemingly tranquil scene and apparently deserted city. They conclude that
Zhuge Liang has set a cunning trap by concealing substantial forces, and they will
be victims of an ambush if they attack. The upshot is that the enemy army withdraws
without a fight. The important point to remember is that the success of the
unorthodox method in this instance is contingent on two ‘orthodox’ facts being
known to the enemy commanders. First, they know of Zhuge Liang’s reputation as a
cunning and skilled strategist; second, they know that he has sizeable and capable
armed forces. Thus, in this case, the unorthodox would not succeed without an
orthodox component. 27
Both orthodox and unorthodox methods were used in imperial China. In the
Ming dynasty (1368–1644), for example, during one of several campaigns against
202 The Evolution of Operational Art