the conflict. The fig leaf suited all the de facto combatants because it prevented
the war from escalating beyond the confines of the Korean Peninsula and/or into
a more destructive conflagration between the superpowers. The Chinese main-
tained the element of surprise in their intervention because forces moved only
under cover of darkness and remained hidden during daylight. Nevertheless, such
measures did not negate the need for orthodox combat operations—vicious and
hard-hitting campaigns of annihilation waged by the CPV against forces of the
United Nations Command (UNC)—although the CPV retained a preference for
night-time operations. 32 In all, more than 2.3 million troops and 600,000 civilian
labourers served in Korea between 1950 and 1953. The Chinese suffered a total of
more than a million casualties (killed, wounded, missing in action, and captured). 33
Chinese troops also employed orthodox and unorthodox means against ad-
versaries in other conflicts. The PLA used concentration of forces along with
stealth and surprise in operations against Indian troops high in the Himalayas in
1962 and against Soviet troops along the Ussuri River in 1969. These combined
methods proved more successfully implemented in the series of campaigns along
the disputed southern border with India than it did seven years later against the
Soviet Red Army on China’s northern border. 34 Indeed, the Himalayan campaign
is widely considered to be the PLA’s most successful post-1949 military operation.
The three-phase campaign waged in late 1962 was meticulously planned, skilfully
executed, and bore most of the hallmarks of the Chinese operational art. PLA
infantry numbering in the thousands manoeuvred well on high-altitude terrain,
concentrating forces to launch surprise attacks on the scattered Indian army
units, and always maintaining the initiative. In the first phase, they pushed
their adversaries back across the demarcation line; in the second phase, they
crossed the border and further punished Indian troops. After announcing a
unilateral ceasefire, in the third phase, the PLA forces withdrew in good order,
releasing Indian prisoners of war and captured equipment. 35
Elements of surprise and deception were also employed by China in the 1979
war with Vietnam with modest success, but these aspects certainly did not prove
decisive in the conflict. China sought to keep troop movements secret in the lead-
up to the war, and then during the conflict Chinese forces tried to confuse their
adversaries as to the main thrust of the attack as the PLA attacked at half a dozen
points spread out along a broad front. The Chinese concentrated on orthodox
invasion thrusts into Vietnam in two theatres of operations starting on 17
February. In the west, forces from the Kunming Military Region, commanded
by General Yang Dezhi, attacked, while, in the east, forces from the Guangzhou
Military Region, led by General Xu Shiyou, attacked. The operational goals were
the destruction of Vietnamese military forces in the border area and the capture
of several provincial capitals. The PLA utilized more than 300,000 troops arrayed
in infantry, armour, and artillery units. These offensives were conventional
manoeuvres that were poorly executed and Chinese forces became bogged
down in the rugged mountainous terrain in bloody combat against stubborn,
entrenched Vietnamese defenders. While the provincial capitals of Lao Cai and
Cao Bang were eventually seized, these achievements took days instead of hours
204 The Evolution of Operational Art