China successfully detonated its first nuclear device in 1964. 45 Equally important
was the decision in 1965 to develop a ballistic missile programme. 46 In sum, while
man has been considered central in Chinese operational art, leveraging technolo-
gy has been viewed as critical, especially in the contemporary era.
Offence and defence
The Great Wall is often interpreted as being emblematic of the defensive nature of
Chinese strategy—the Chinese certainly insist this is the case. 47 While the wall
might symbolize this at the strategic level—although it should be noted that there
is significant scholarship suggesting that Chinese wall building has little, if
anything, to do with a defensive strategic tradition—it does not appear to hold
for the operational level. 48 The construction and maintenance of walls along
imperial China’s northern borders did not mean the end of offensive operations
against the nomadic peoples of Central Asia.
What about China’s operational art? Is it primarily defensive in character? The
answer lies in the observation that, from ancient times, Chinese strategists have
admonished commanders to seize the initiative and never relinquish it. Sun Zi
certainly underscored this in chapter 6 ofThe Art of War, urging a commander to
select the locations for battles and campaigns instead of permitting one’s adver-
sary to do so: ‘Therefore, those skilled in war [must] bring the enemy to the field
of battle and are not brought there by him’. 49
In imperial China, generals sought to seize the initiative, which included both
offensive and defensive military operations. What we now think of as the Great
Wall and what most tourists see in locations near Beijing actually dates from the
Ming dynasty (1368–1644). 50 Nevertheless, over the course of the 275 years of the
Ming, China did not simply conduct defensive military operations. Many mili-
tary expeditions were launched against the Mongols, the Vietnamese, the Japa-
nese in Korea, as well as a variety of offensive operations to quell domestic
rebellions and mutinies.
This included various Ming campaigns to deal with a perpetual scourge
afflicting China’s coastal regions: piracy. Pirates were routinely active all along
the Chinese coast operating from bases in maritime south-eastern China. One of
the most effective generals in dealing with the pirates was Qi Jiguang (1528–87)
who focused on deploying several thousand carefully selected troops in both
defensive and offensive operations on land and sea. With limited funding, Qi had
to rely on simple weaponry and small ships. He focused the bulk of his energies
on intensive drilling and modest junks each staffed by approximately fifty-five
men. Then crew were divided into five units each assigned different tasks from
handling artillery to firing arquebuses. The secret to Qi’s success at anti-piracy
operations appeared to be his dogged persistence along with readiness to shift
quickly from a defensive stance into an offensive mode. This allowed him to wear
down the less-disciplined pirates and ultimately defeat them. 51
208 The Evolution of Operational Art