In modern times, Mao Zedong also urged his generals to maintain the initia-
tive—even when on the strategic defensive during the initial phase of people’s
war. Mao advocated the operational principle of ‘active defence’. While in the
earliest stage of protracted people’s war, Mao called for ‘strategic defence’, this did
not mean surrendering the initiative. Moreover, while Mao advocated that his
forces strike only after the enemy had struck, he did not mean simply waiting for
an attack to come.
Strategic defence did not mean passive defence but included offensive opera-
tions. Thus, active defence did not condemn defenders to digging in and just
waiting for the enemy to attack; rather, they could and should take the initiative
as circumstances permitted. 52
In the post-Mao era, active defence has altered its meaning to become an
important strategic-level concept. Today, PLA strategists teach that the first battle
is the decisive one and that he who strikes first has the advantage. In the twenty-
first century, active defence does not preclude pre-emptive strikes. 53 According to
Deng Xiaoping (also transliterated Teng Hsiao-ping), CCP leader and strategist,
‘active defense is not merely defense per se, but also includes...our going out’.
Senior Colonel Wang Naiming, writing in 1995, asserts that the principle of active
defence epitomizes ‘the organic integration of offense and defense’. 54 Whatever
the meaning of the principle, it seems that Chinese soldiers are willing and able to
employ both offensive and defensive operations. Thus, Mao’s comments about
operational art in the period of protracted revolutionary war made in the 1930s
still resonate in the twenty-first century: ‘Militarily speaking, our warfare consists
of the alternate use of the defensive and the offensive’. 55
Positional and mobile warfare
Consecutive dynasties and commanders have emphasized positional warfare.
Indeed, China is famous for its sturdy and enduring fortifications, notably the
legendary Great Wall of China. While successive Chinese rulers did engage in wall
building, careful research has shown that the narrative of a massive fortification
extending thousands of miles first constructed by the Emperor Qin Shihuang
back in the second-century BC is a myth. The myth is potent because Qin is also
credited with founding the first powerful unified Chinese state, and it is his tomb
near present-day Xian which was unearthed in 1974 to reveal a massive army of
terracotta warriors.
But Chinese generals have since ancient times engaged in mobile operations.
This was true in the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Periods. Generals
employed chariots, cavalry, as well as massed infantry in campaigns against their
adversaries. Mobile warfare continued into the dynastic era even as many emper-
ors built and maintained mud, brick, or stone forts and walls as protection
against northern nomadic peoples who launched raids against and even invasions
of the northern Chinese plain. Furthermore, most cities were walled to protect
against bandits and rival armies. For a significant period of Chinese history, until
The Chinese Way of War 209