natural disasters, such as the tragic 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Doctrinal develop-
ment suggests refinements and increasing sophistication in combined and joint
operations. Performances in PKOs reveal that the PLA is more capable. Of course,
China sends its brightest commanders and best-trained forces abroad. These
operations, at considerable distances from home, have involved relatively small
units and in most cases, many functions, including overall command, control,
and logistics, have been performed by the militaries of other countries. In recent
years, the PLA has sought to make field exercises more realistic with opposition
forces and live ammunition, for example. China has also conducted a growing
number of multinational exercises, including a number beyond China’s borders,
with a variety of other countries, most notably with the militaries of member
countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 78
The PLA’s operational response to the spring 1989 demonstrations in Beijing
was mixed. On the one hand, this was not the kind of scenario for which the
armed forces had trained or were equipped; on the other, the forces performed
unevenly. However, in the final analysis, use of lethal force against unarmed
civilians was caused less by the operational inadequacies of China’s military
than by glaring incompetence and acute paranoia on the part of China’s political
leaders. 79 Lastly, the PLA’s response to the devastating earthquake that struck
Sichuan Province in May 2008 showcased the heroics and muscle power of
dedicated Chinese soldiers rather than any enhanced operational capabilities
for humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. The PLA was found wanting in
terms of the availability of appropriate technology, the ability swiftly to mobilize
manpower and equipment and transport these promptly to the affected region.
Taken together, these episodes reveal that China’s armed forces are increasingly
sophisticated and more capable operationally, while, at the same time, the PLA
continues to be hamstrung by certain limitations, including inadequate force-
projection capabilities even within China’s own borders. 80
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Chinese operational art is on the
cusp of change. Joint- and combined-arms operations are now taken seriously,
although the use of air power has never been a critical factor in Chinese military
conflict in the twentieth century. What has been a central preoccupation, however,
is countering enemy air power, such as in Korea in the 1950s. This preoccupation
continues today and, as a result, a significant element of the PLA air-force mission
in the early twenty-first century is air defence. 81 Meanwhile, maritime operations
are of increasing interest as China pays greater attention to the strategic signifi-
cance of the seas. One indication of this is the PLA navy’s dispatch of a small flotilla
in December 2008 to engage in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
NOTES- For some excellent recent surveys of Chinese military history, see David Graff and
Robin Higham (eds.),A Military History of China(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002);
Xiaobing Li,A History of the Modern Chinese Army(Lexington, KY: University Press of
216 The Evolution of Operational Art