Kentucky, 2007); Bruce A. Elleman,Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989(London:
Routledge, 2001); Peter Lorge,War, Politics, and Society in Early Modern China,
900–1795(London: Routledge, 2005); David A. Graff,Medieval Chinese Warfare,
300–900(London: Routledge, 2002). For an extremely comprehensive treatment of
campaigns in China since the late 1940s, see Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and
Michael A. McDevitt (eds.),Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).
- See, for example, Geoffrey Parker (ed.),Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The
Triumph of the West(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2; John Keegan,
A History of Warfare(London: Hutchinson, 1993), 214–15.
- See, for example, Michael I. Handel,Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought(3rd
rev. edn.; London: Routledge, 2007).
- Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (chief editors),The Science of Military Strategy
(Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), 4. This is the official English
translation of the 2001 Chinese-language bookZhanlue xue[Junshi Kexue Chu-
banshe]. Some of the most well-known of these ancient tomes can be found in
Ralph D. Sawyer (trans.),The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China(Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1993).
- Mao noted the influence of such books to his first Western biographer. See Edgar
Snow,Red Star over China(New York: Random House, 1938), 115–16. On the wider
influence ofThe Water MarginandRomance of the Three Kingdomson contemporary
Chinese strategists, see Ralph D. Sawyer with Mei-Chun Lee Sawyer,The Tao of
Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China(New York: Basic
Books, 2007), 331–54.
- See, for example, John K. Fairbank, ‘Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military
Experience’, in Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank (eds.),Chinese Ways in
Warfare(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1–26. For a critical
discussion of these contentions, see Andrew Scobell,China’s Use of Military Force:
Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March(New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003), ch. 2.
- Peng and Yao,The Science of Military Strategy,3.
- Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, ‘Strategy and National Psychology in
China’,Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science, CLXX (1967),
143–55 (quote is on 152). For perhaps the most sustained treatment, see Sawyer with
Sawyer,The Tao of Deception.
- Handel,Masters of War, 25. Handel calls Sun Zi’s approach to war an ‘idealized
paradigm’ (ibid., 22).
- This thinking pervades a number of works, including Ross Munro and Richard
Bernstein,The Coming Conflict with China(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).
- See, for example, Edward L. Dreyer, ‘The Poyang Campaign, 1363: Inland Naval
Warfare in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty’, in Kierman, Jr., and Fairbank (eds.),
Chinese Ways in Warfare, 202–42.
- See, for example, Michael McDevitt, ‘The Strategic and Operational Context Driving
PLA Navy Building’ and Bernard D. Cole, ‘Right-Sizing the Navy: How Much Naval
Force Will Beijing Deploy?’ both in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell,Right-
Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military(Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 481–556.
- On Chinese anti-access strategies, see Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase,
Derek Eaton, and Kevin Pollpeter,Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess
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