- These different means of achieving victory are highlighted by Lieutenant General Li Jijun,
former vice-president of the Academy of Military Science, in an address to the US Army
War College in July 1997. See Li Jijun,Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive
Strategy of China, Letort Paper no. 1 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
1997), 5. General Li also notes the capture of a third city, Hohehot, by stratagem. - Larry Wortzel makes the same point. See Wortzel, ‘The Beiping–Tianjin Campaign of
1948–1949’, 67. - For a useful volume of analyses and selected translations of Chinese military memoirs,
see Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu (trans. and eds.),Mao’s Generals
Remember Korea(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001). - Li,A History of the Modern Chinese Army,110–11.
- See Thomas Robinson, ‘The Sino-Indian Border Conflicts of 1969: New Evidence
Three Decades Later’, in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt (eds.),Chinese Warfighting,
198–216. - Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, ‘PLA Operational Principles and Limited War: The
Sino-Indian War of 1962’, in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt (eds.),Chinese Warfight-
ing, 173–97. See also Li Jijun,Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy
of China,5. - Zhang Xiaoming, ‘China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment’,China Quarterly,
no. 184 (December 2005), 863–5. This account is largely consistent with the earlier
one by Harlan Jencks. See Harlan W. Jencks, ‘China’s “Punitive” War on Vietnam:
A Military Assessment’,Asian Survey, 19 (August 1979), 801–15. Jencks also notes the
very slow progress of operations against Lang Son (ibid., 811). See also Edward C.
O’Dowd,Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War
(New York: Routledge, 2007). - On the date of the introduction of the crossbow, see Joseph Needham, Robin D. S.
Yates with the collaboration of Krzysztof Gawlikowski, Edward McEwen, and Wang
Ling,Science and Civilization in China, vol. 5,Chemistry and Chemical Technology,
part. VI,Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), 139. For more on the crossbow, see 120–83. - For analyses of siege warfare in medieval China, see Herbert Franke, ‘Siege and
Defense of Towns in Medieval China’, in Kierman, Jr., and Fairbank (eds.),Chinese
Ways of Warfare, 151–201; and Needham et al.,Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges,
241–485. - Edward L. Dreyer, ‘Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China’, in William W.
Whitson (ed.),The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s(New York:
Praeger, 1971), 3–24. - Lorge,War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 125.
- Arthur Waldron,From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924–1925(New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 4. - ‘On Protracted War’, 143.
- Liu Zhen,Liu Zhen Huiyilu[Memoirs of Liu Zhen] (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe,
1990), 337–8 and 342, quoted in Scobell,China’s Use of Military Force, 90–1. - See, for example, Jonathan D. Pollack, ‘The Korean War and Sino-American Rela-
tions’, in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (eds.),Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955:
A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources,
1989), 226–7. - John W. Lewis and Xue Litai,China Builds the Bomb(Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1988).
The Chinese Way of War 219