Strategies and Their Implications for the United States(Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2007). On the PLA’s threat to the US military, see Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing
Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Its Challenge for U.S. Security
Policy’,International Security, 25: 4 (Spring 2001), 5–40.
- This point is also made by other students of Chinese strategy and war fighting,
including Paul H. B. Godwin. See, for example, Paul H. B. Godwin, ‘Change and
Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949–1999’, in Ryan, Finkelstein, and
McDevitt (eds.),Chinese Warfighting, 23.
- ‘On Protracted War’ (May 1938), inSelected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. II (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 136–45.
- Li,A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 72.
- Ibid., 72–5.
- Liao–Shen is short for Liaoxi–Shenyang campaign (12 September–2 November 1948);
Ping–Jin is short for Beiping–Tianjin campaign (21 November 1948–31 January
1949); Huai–Hai is short for Huai River–Lunghai Railway (6 November 1948–10
January 1949).
- Li,A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 75.
- Gary J. Bjorge,Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA’s Huai Hai
Campaign, Leavenworth Paper no. 22 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Insti-
tute Press, 2004).
- For concise discussion of these asserted proclivities, see Andrew Scobell, ‘Is There a
Chinese Way of War?’Parameters, XXXV: 1 (Spring 2005), 118–22.
- ‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War’ (December 1936), inSelected
Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 185–6. See also
ten operational principles identified by Mao. These are located in ‘The Present
Situation and Our Tasks’ (25 December 1947), inSelected Works of Mao Tse-tung,
vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 161–2. These operational principles
remain relevant in the twenty-first century. See Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye
(eds.),Zhanyi Xue[The Study of Campaigns] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe,
2000). While there is no official English translation of this volume, it has been the
focus of a number of English-language analyses. See, for example, Christensen, ‘Posing
Problems without Catching Up’ and Dennis J. Blasko,The Chinese Army Today:
Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century(London: Routledge, 2006), ch. 5.
- Orthodox and unorthodox are the terms preferred by Ralph Sawyer. Sawyer with
Sawyer,The Seven Military Classics, 164–5. Samuel Griffith prefers to translatezheng
andqias ‘normal’ and ‘extraordinary’, respectively. See Samuel Griffith (trans.),Sun
Tzu: The Art of War(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 91.
- This is the Sawyers’ translation. See theirThe Seven Military Classics, 165. For more
discussion on the meaning of ‘unorthodox’, see Sawyer with Sawyer,The Tao of
Deception, 61–6.
- ‘Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan’ (May 1938), inSelected Works of
Mao Tse-tung, vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 81.
- See, for example, the discussion in Handel,Masters of War, ch. 11.
- This episode is summarized in Griffith (trans.),Sun Tzu, 97–8, and recounted in
Sawyer with Sawyer,The Tao of Deception, 362–71.
- Peter Lorge,War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795(London:
Routledge, 2005), 134.
- Larry M. Wortzel, ‘The Beiping–Tianjin Campaign of 1948–1949’, in Ryan, Finkel-
stein, and McDevitt (eds.),Chinese Warfighting, 57.
218 The Evolution of Operational Art
