- Li,A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 174.
- Li Jijun,Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China,4.
- On the history behind the myth of the construction of the Great Wall, see Arthur
Waldron,The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth(New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990). See also Nicola Di Cosmo,Ancient China and Its Enemies
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 4. - Griffith (trans.),Sun Tzu, 96.
- Waldron,The Great Wall of China.
- Lorge,War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 126–8.
- ‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War’ (September 1936), inSelected
Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. I, 204–8. - Scobell,China’s Use of Military Force, 35.
- The Deng quotation is from Chen Zhou, ‘Differences between China’s Theory of
Modern Local War and America’s Theory of Limited War’,Zhongguo Junshe Kexue,4
(1995), 46; and Wang Naiming, ‘Adhere to Active Defense and Modern People’s War’,
in Michael Pillsbury (ed.),Chinese Views of Future Warfare(Washington, DC: Nation-
al Defense University Press, 1997), 37. Both quotations can be found in Scobell,
China’s Use of Military Force, 35. - ‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War’, 208.
- Waldron,The Great Wall of China, 76.
- Ibid., 103, 105.
- Ibid., chs. 7, 8, 9.
- Griffith (trans.),Sun Tzu, 72, 104, 174.
- Sawyer with Sawyer,The Tao of Deception, 146–50.One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies
first appeared in China approximately 600 years ago. See Sawyer with Sawyer,The Tao
of Deception, 291–5. - ‘A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire’ (January 1930),Selected Works of Mao Tse-
tung, vol. I, 121. - See, for example, guideline 4 of Mao’s operational principles: ‘Present Situation and
Our Tasks’, 161. - See guideline 9 of Mao’s operational principles: ‘Present Situation and Our Tasks’, 162.
- Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army,96–101; Pollack, ‘The Korean War and Sino-
American Relations’, 224–5. - Zhang, ‘China’s 1979 War with Vietnam’, 871; and Li, A History of the Modern Chinese
Army,254–7. - Jonathan Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih,Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980
(Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1993). - Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt, ‘Introduction: Patterns of PLA
Warfighting’, in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt (eds.),Chinese Warfighting, 9–10. - On this episode, see Sawyer with Sawyer,The Tao of Deception, 3–6. See also Sun
Haichen,The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies from Ancient China(Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1993). For a discussion of the thirty-six stratagems, see Sawyer with
Sawyer,The Tao of Deception, 354–9. - Lorge,War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China,121–3.
- Thomas J. Christensen,Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and
Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996),
ch. 6. - Scobell,China’s Use of Military Force, ch. 8.
220 The Evolution of Operational Art