The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

(Tina Meador) #1

timeless (protracted), (e)thepartiesfightsoastonotlosetheforce,and(f) new uses
are being found for old weapons and organizations.
The objectives for the use of military force in industrial war are hard and
simple: ‘take, hold, destroy, defeat’ are the sort of words used. Success is measured
in territory taken and forces destroyed. In war amongst the people, the objectives
are malleable and complex, they describe a condition, which enables intentions to
be changed or formed by other means; an example would be ‘create a safe and
secure environment’. And the more we seek to establish law and order, the more
the will or intentions of the people become the objective. Indeed, the strategic
objective is more often than not to capture the will of the people or at least render
it neutral.
The next trend is that we tend to carry out these actions in a multinational
grouping or in non-state groupings, and sometimes this applies to only one side.
These coalitions need not be the formal ones, like the NATO alliance or the UN;
they can be formed in the event such as in Iraq in 2008. The non-state nature of
the operation is particularly evident in the theatre of operations; however formal
the alliance, the force is composed only of contingents provided by the allies
willing to contribute on the day, and they are in an informal alliance with the
agencies representing the other means, usually other intergovernmental organi-
zations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The non-state
groupings are legion: Hezbollah, the Northern Alliance, the Taliban, and so on.
The third and most obvious trend is that war takes place amongst the people.
First, the objective is the will of the people. Second, those operating to the tenets
of the guerrilla depend on the people for concealment, for support, both moral
and physical, and for information. Third, these conflicts take place amongst the
people in another sense, through the media. Whoever coined the phrase ‘the
theatre of operations’ was very prescient. We operate now as though we were in a
theatre or Roman circus. The theatre commander needs to produce, write, act,
and tell a more compelling story than his opponent in the minds of the people,
both those in the circus pit and those in the stands. For the people, the strategic
objective, every military act is part of a drama that in some cases directly involves
them. Their understanding and support for what is happening are shaped by the
context, timing, and presentation of the act. The military acts, the conflict with
the opponent, are supporting elements of the drama of the confrontation. All
measures, military and the others, must be concerted to achieving advantage in
the overarching confrontation: to dislocate the opponent’s military acts from his
confrontational purpose in the minds of the people.
The fourth trend is that war amongst the people is timeless or protracted. We
set out to win industrial wars quickly, because the whole of society was involved,
and we wanted to get back to peace and have a normal life. In our new
circumstances, timing is more important than doing things to time. The basic
tactic is to engage only on one’s own terms, when it is to your advantage to do so
safely. And when our military objectives are to set conditions in which other
instruments of power resolve the confrontation, then we must maintain the
condition until they succeed.


Epilogue 235
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