The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

(Tina Meador) #1

means—these include, for example, diplomatic, political, economic, social, and
legal measures.
A confrontation occurs when two or more bodies in broadly the same circum-
stances are pursuing different outcomes. The confrontation is resolved when one
or both parties adjust their desired outcomes to accommodate the other. Con-
frontations are decided to one’s advantage or won by changing the other’s
intentions. Political affairs of all stripes, national and international, are about
resolving confrontations. When the parties decide to work together or to abide by
some rules or law, they are resolved. But when one or both sides cannot get their
way and will not accept an alternative outcome, they sometimes seek to use
military force to get it—they turn to conflict. With industrial war, military force
was used to decide the confrontation directly; conflict was decisive strategically.
However, in war amongst the people force is used sub-strategically, usually
only tactically. This is done for two reasons: the side that has small forces, if it
is wise, does not play to the opponent’s strengths, but rather follows the path of
the guerrilla, avoiding set battle and the operationally or strategically decisive
engagement, so as not to present the stronger opponent with opportunities to
strike the mortal blows. The side that has large forces and possibly has nuclear
weapons has too much to lose in using all of its strength. The costs to the
economy of mobilizing society, such as in industrial war, are too great; the use
of such force would be disproportionate and flout international law; and starting
a nuclear war would have great political costs, quite apart from risking mankind
and the environment.
The weaker side follows a generic strategy composed of the ‘propaganda of the
deed’, the ‘strategy of provocation’, and the ‘erosion of will’ so as to advance their
position in the overall confrontation. Sometimes the weak seek to replicate the
strength of the stronger side rather than match it and, for example, develop a
nuclear weapon, while following the same generic strategy. Those who might be
supposed to be the stronger side because of having large and apparently strong
forces find it difficult to gain advantage, to exert power. The philosopher Michel
Foucalt said, ‘power is a relationship not a possession’. Finding the way to
establish that relationship to one’s advantage is the strategic question of our time.
Note that just because the use of force is only tactical, it does not mean that
there will not be big fights or that the future is one of urban terrorism. Nor is it to
say that we will not fight for objectives to do with state sovereignty. It is to say that
force will not achieve this directly or strategically; it may, if used well, establish a
condition in which the objective is achieved by other means. We need to find a
way to bring these other means to bear at the appropriate time and place in
conjunction with the use of military force.
War amongst the people has sixcharacteristics or trends that make it different from
industrial war. In each particular case the trends are more or less so, their significance
is different, and they are in a different balance. The six trends are as follows: (a)the
ends or strategicobjectives are changing from the hard, simpleobjectives of industrial
war to soft or malleable conditional objectives, (b)theyareconductedbynon-state
and multinational organizations, (c) they take place amongst the people, (d)theyare


234 The Evolution of Operational Art

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