Initially, the Stavka itself was surprised by the number of troops, roughly
290,000, that had been encircled at Stalingrad. Accordingly, it re-enforced the
encircling forces and, on 10 January 1943, it mounted Operation Ring to reduce
the pocket. In almost a month of bloody fighting, the Soviet forces cut the
encircled German forces into parts and forced a final surrender of Field Marshal
von Paulus on 2 February. About 90,000 men marched into captivity. By winning
a decisive victory, Zhukov and Vasilevky had demonstrated the Red Army’s
mastery of operational art.
Whereas Operation Uranus was a great success, the almost simultaneous
Operation Mars is usually considered a failure and has been labelled Zhukov’s
‘greatest defeat’. 43 The objective was to dislodge the Germans from the Rzhev
salient west of Moscow, known as ‘the Rzhev meat grinder’ owing to the heavy
casualties inflicted on attacking Soviet forces. Initially timed to precede Opera-
tion Uranus, Operation Mars was delayed because of heavy rains and muddy
conditions. When the heavy frost came and the ground hardened, the Stavka
rescheduled to start on 25 November. Then nothing went right. Fog and snow
reduced the effectiveness of the initial artillery preparation. The attacking forces
made progress on only one axis, and Model’s counter-attacks with available
armour first contained the initial penetrations and then surrounded elements
of a mechanized corps and rifle corps. The Soviets suffered heavy casualties and
made only very limited gains; they did not succeed in removing the threat to
Moscow once and for all. Possibly, in order to save Zhukov’s reputation, some
Soviet–Russian critics have claimed that Operation Mars has been misinter-
preted. In reality, they claim, it was a relatively minor undertaking aimed at
drawing attention away from the Stalingrad Front. 44KURSK: THE PREMEDITATED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONThe strategic-operational success at Stalingrad did not mean the German army
had forever lost the initiative on the Eastern Front. In February–March 1943,
Field Marshal von Manstein conducted a brilliant counter-blow against the
offensive of the South-Western Front towards Kharkov. Vasilevsky, who observed
this operation from the Stavka, noted that Vatutin incorrectly assumed that
German defences were weak and that his forces had an opportunity to drive
on towards Kharkov and beyond to the Dnieper. Stalin approved the advance
towards Kharkov, and, when that city fell, he approved the continuation of the
offensive. In fact, Manstein had rallied his new command, Army Group Don, and
received serious re-enforcements from the west, including SS Panzer units now
operating as an SS Panzer Corps. Manstein achieved a brilliant success. The local
commanders and the Stavka had underestimated the recovery power of the
Wehrmacht and the operational skills of Field Marshal von Manstein. 45 Stalin
sent Zhukov to the threatened sector and released sufficient Stavka reserves (the
64th Army, the 1st Tank Army, and the 21st Army) to change the correlation of
78 The Evolution of Operational Art