of cutting off all Soviet forces within it. Kursk has been presented as the greatest
tank battle of the Eastern Front, but it was as much a combined-arms fight. Soviet
infantry, anti-tank guns, and artillery inflicted losses on the attackers and limited
the manoeuvre of German armour. Soviet engineers had mined the area, created
anti-tank obstacles, and constructed bunkers and command posts to manage the
fight. Both sides employed massed aviation in support of the tactical fight, and
the intensive struggle for command of the air began in May and continued up to
the beginning of the operation. On the morning of 5 July, the Soviet air force struck
German airfields at dawn but did not inflict serious damage. Air power on both
sides now shifted its emphasis to direct combat support. Given the growing threat
to the Reich from Allied bombers, this was the last time the Luftwaffe would be able
to mass fighter aviation in the east.
In the north, Model, who attacked with armour and infantry, found his forces
coming under heavy artillery fire before they could jump off. This created some
confusion, and caused his forces, which were only making slow progress, to
become tied down in the Central Front’s defences. At this juncture, on 12 July,
Zhukov authorized Popov’s Bryansk Front to initiate Operation Kutuzov and
attack with its 4th Tank Army and 61st Army with the objective of cutting off
Model’s forces at Orel. Only the intervention of the Luftwaffe reduced Soviet
armour and permitted the 9th Army to retreat.
In the south, Manstein struck with Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army and Army Detach-
ment Kempf and managed to break through two lines of tactical defences, causing
Zhukov to order elements of the Steppe Front to advance and take on the German
armour in a series of meeting engagements. The commitment of Rotmistrov’s 5th
Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka against the II SS Panzer Corps on 12 July
produced a major tank fight and resulted in what was probably a Soviet tactical
draw and operational success. 50 Manstein had assumed that a breakthrough by
the II SS Panzer Corps would put his forces beyond the Soviet tactical defences
and into open country. In fact, Prokhorovka was at the third, but not the last,
Soviet defensive belt. His flank units were still hemmed in by Soviet infantry and
artillery, and his troops were approaching exhaustion as new Soviet units joined
the fight. 51
On 13 July, following the news of the Allies landing in Sicily, Hitler called his
commanders back to East Prussia for consultation. Hitler proposed a temporary
pause in Operation Citadel and the dispatch of some armour units to Italy to
bolster its defence in case of Sicily’s fall. Manstein asked that the operation
continue in order to destroy more Soviet armour and delay a follow-on Soviet
offensive. Hitler agreed to a short continuation. On 16 July, the 4th Panzer Army’s
units returned to their jump-off points. The myth of Blitzkrieg was dispelled in
those deeply echeloned and prepared defences at Kursk. In the absence of
surprise, tactical competence and advanced technology would not overcome a
well-prepared and well-conducted defence. For Vasilevsky, the defensive success
set the stage for broad offensive possibilities against the Wehrmacht, which Soviet
forces were now in a position to exploit. 52 Russian military commentators today
still find Kursk to be worthy of study as the classic example of a successful
80 The Evolution of Operational Art