premeditated defence. 53 Andrei Kokoshin, former first deputy minister of Russia
and a leading scholar of Soviet and Russian military history, has called Kursk ‘the
greatest event in world history because it was the point when Germany finally lost
the strategic-operational initiative’. 54
Manstein had inflicted some damage on the Red Army. A major regrouping of
forces went forward in the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts with replacements of men
and equipment going to those units that had suffered losses at Kursk. Operation
Polkovodets Rumiantsev was not launched until 3 August. But its initial success,
which liberated Belgorod and opened the door to Kharkov, demonstrated that the
battle of attrition at Kursk had bled the Wehrmacht much more than the Red
Army. By 23 August, Kharkov was in the hands of the Red Army and German
forces were falling back towards the Dnieper.
BAGRATION AND LVOV–SANDOMIERZ:
OPERATIONAL ART MATUREDUndoubtedly, the most outstanding example of Soviet operational art during this
period involves the linked operations Bagration and Lvov–Sandomierz in the
summer of 1944. The geostrategic situation confronting Hitler’s Germany was
dire. The Wehrmacht’s losses on all fronts in 1943 had been severe. Moreover, US
and British bombers were now attacking the Reich’s cities day and night. Allied
forces had just landed at Normandy and secured and expanded their beachhead
and were gathering strength for their breakout. In Italy, Rome had fallen on 5
June. In the east, the Soviets had lifted the Blockade of Leningrad, swept across
the Dnieper, and liberated Odessa and Sevastopol. The German position was
vulnerable. Army Group North still held a line from the Gulf of Finland and
through Narva, Pskov, and Nevel covering the Baltic states, Army Group Centre
held the Belorussian ‘balcony’, with Vitebsk, Bobruysk on the Berezina River,
and Mogilev on the Dnieper River serving as strong points, down to the
Pripiat Marshes. Army Group North Ukraine held the German line from
the Pripiat Marshes south to the Carpathian Mountains with Lvov close behind
its forward positions. The major Soviet summer offensive was expected here and
German armour had shifted to this sector of the front. 55 Army Group South
Ukraine held the line from the Carpathian Mountains to the Black Sea coast with
its southern sector anchored on the Dniester and covering Bessarabia and the
coastal approach to the Romanian capital and the oilfields at Ploesti. The
demands of a two-front war meant that the German defenders were spread
thin. Mobile formations, that is, Panzer Corps, could not provide significant
mass against all possible axes the Soviets might use. This was the strategic
situation on the eve of Operation Bagration.
The Soviet general staff had begun planning its major summer offensive during
the winter. It had requested and received the arms, men, and logistical support it
The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991 81