Building Anew 433of three categories of states: civilized, barbarian, and savage. Th e savage
group could easily have been called the “third world,” although that par tic-
u lar expression was only coined in 1952, by a French demographer, anthro-
pologist, and economic historian named Alfred Sauvy. He was comparing
the colonial areas of the world to the disenfranchised middle classes of
France prior to the French Revolution— the Th ird Estate.
One important early step in the advance of the less developed world to
full membership in the international community was the fi nal abrogation of
extraterritoriality privileges. Th e consular courts of Egypt closed their doors
in 1949 (as provided by the Montreux Convention of 1937). In China, too,
extraterritoriality was, at long last, brought to an end, by way of a series of
bilateral treaties. Th e decisive step here was a termination agreement con-
cluded with the United States in 1943. Over the next four years, similar
treaties with all of the other relevant powers ended extraterritoriality com-
pletely in the Celestial Empire (or republic, as it now was).
A more striking development was the attainment of in de pen dence by co-
lonial areas all over the world. Indonesia and India (along with Ceylon,
Pakistan, and Burma) took the lead in the immediate postwar years. Th e
pace picked up in the 1950s, as African colonies began to achieve in de pen-
dence, with a large onrush of new states occurring around 1960. In po liti-
cal terms, this development marked a major change, but in legal terms, less
so. Th e new governments were generally more concerned to participate
in the international legal system— that is, to benefi t from it— than to over-
throw it.
Th e governments of the new countries had a certain natural affi nity to the
socialist states. For one thing, the socialists had a long record of vociferous
opposition to colonialism. In addition, many of the new states sought to de-
velop eco nom ical ly along socialist lines, with centrally directed economies.
Th e affi nity extended into the legal fi eld as well, for the new states, like the
socialist ones, found the mainstream positivist version of international law to
be the most conducive to their interests, and for much the same reason. Th e
principle of the sovereign equality of states and the prohibition against inter-
vention by outside countries— no matter how powerful— had obvious attrac-
tions to poor and militarily weak countries. Instant and automatic legal
equality with the major powers— coupled with autonomy to go their own
way in terms of national policies— proved an irresistible combination.