The Eurasian Triangle. Russia, the Caucasus and Japan, 1904-1945

(WallPaper) #1

178 Ë War and Dénouement


would ght with the same vigor as before and with the same support as before. (Clearly


the reference to the “same support as before” implied Japan’s support.) It turned out,


according to Kruashvili’s report to Bammat, that their comrades in Georgia had es-


tablished links in all of Georgia (and in Armenia as well), and that everywhere peo-


ple were interested in their movement. But the Kruashvili-Tedoradze mission was cut


short: their arrival coincided with the uncovering by the Soviet police of a clandestine


“Turkish” organization in Ajaria. Sensing danger, they returned to Turkey. Fired on at


the border, the two managed to return to Turkey, although Tedoradze was wounded.³⁵


Germany having withdrawn (only for the time being, as it turned out), Britain and


France came decisively onto the Caucasian scene. Both countries had maneuvered


to turn Germany and the Soviet Union against each other to their mutual destruc-


tion, but the maneuver failed, resulting in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. They now


had to face the dire consequences. On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, to


which Britain and France responded militarily, albeit feebly. World War II thus began.


Along with the Polish army, Caucasian émigré groups fought against the German in-


vaders.³⁶In accordance with the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the


Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland and annexed it to Ukraine and Belarus. Poland


was thus destroyed by Germany and the Soviet Union. Following its agreement with


Germany, the Soviet Union duly provided oil, grain, and other vitally needed materials


to the Nazis. In November 1939, the Soviet Union further invaded Finland, demanding


the concession of border territory. By default, Moscow thus became a de facto enemy


of Britain and France. This prompted the two countries to target the oil elds in the


Caucasus for destruction, for they accounted for approximately 80 percent of the oil


supply in the Soviet Union, by means of which Moscow was assisting Germany’s war


eorts.


In the end Operation Pike, as the British-French scheme became known,³⁷was


never carried out, just as the earlier scheme of the two countries to intervene in the


Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union in support of the former never came


to fruition, owing to Finland’s capitulation in March 1940. Considering that an attack


on the Caucasian oil elds would lead to war with the Soviet Union, Britain even en-


tertained the idea of encouraging Japan into battle against the Soviet Union in the Far


East to distract it from the West. Japan had its own scheme of attacking the Caucasian


oil elds as part of its strategy against the Soviet Union. Japan’s taking of Xinjiang, or


Chinese Turkestan, would have placed the oil elds of the Caucasus within the direct


reach of long-range bombers taking o from Xinjiang. Even without Xinjiang, Japan


35 Report by Kruashvili to Bammat (November 1939) from the Bammat family archive in Paris. See
also Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens, 385–88.
36 See Mitat Çelikpala, “The North Caucasian Émigrés between the World Wars.”International Journal
of Turkish Studies9, nos. 1–2 (2003), 313.
37 See Patrick Osborn,Operation Pike: Britain versus the Soviet Union, 1939-1941(Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 2000).

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