48 Wallenstein
of this sum, and then as sales began to come through Wallenstein will
have been able to make repayments and reduce his debt.
A rough calculation suggests that by 1624 Wallenstein had doubled
the value of his gross assets, starting with some two million gulden,
including the Smirˇický estates, and adding a further two million in
net land purchases, giving four million in all, of which about half was
funded by debt. In itself that would have been very sound business, but
the huge tract of land which he put together was in fact worth far more
than twice his original stake. The income was commensurately large,
particularly as Wallenstein boosted the prosperity of his own estates by
directing as much as possible of his military purchasing to them both
before and after he became Imperial generalissimo in 1625. Hence he
would have had no difficulty in making interest payments on the debt
and could doubtless have paid it off quite quickly had he so wished,
and had he not instead been using loans to finance armies in the fol-
lowing years.
How did Wallenstein buy his lands so cheaply? To the envious of the
time and to those inclined to conspiracy theories of history the answer
lay in shady dealings, influence in high places, crooked valuers, playing
fast and loose with debased currency, and other tricks of like nature.
More straightforward explanations are available. First among them is
the sheer quantity of land put on to the market over a short period
by the confiscation process, half of Bohemia and a large proportion of
Moravia. At the same time available purchasers were limited in number,
as the Catholics were a small minority and few of the Protestants were
in a position to buy, while even those Catholics willing and in princi-
ple wealthy enough to do so may have had problems raising sufficient
ready cash. According to the normal law of supply and demand the
price of land would inevitably have fallen sharply. Then there was the
way in which the sale process was conducted. The emperor’s need for
cash meant that it was a question not of securing the last penny but of
getting in the quick penny. If the sales had been spread over the next
decade much greater sums would have been realised, but that was not
a luxury available to the exchequer, and this compounded the over-
supply to drive prices down even further.
Currency debasement will have played a part, but not because of
financial manipulation by Wallenstein or others. Prices rise in response
to devaluation of the currency and thus drive the inflationary circle,
but while those of food and basic necessities react rapidly others move
more slowly. Rents and agricultural tenancies are among the slowest to
adjust as they are commonly fixed over longer periods, so that at the