Some Achieve Greatness 73
the anti-Habsburg views of his parliament and the London mob, and
to the pleadings of his son-in-law Frederick, while in the east Bethlen
Gabor had by no means given up the idea of a further profitable attack
on the Empire. Even within Germany there were opponents who might
join any campaign which showed signs of success, among them the
Protestant electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, who were alarmed by
Ferdinand’s militant recatholicisation in areas under his control, and by
his high-handed transfer of Frederick’s status as an elector of the Empire
to Maximilian of Bavaria in early 1623. And always in the background
was the fear of a renewed revolt in Bohemia and Moravia.
The Habsburgs and their supporters were very much aware of this
dangerous coalition gathering against them. Wallenstein in particular,
with his new lands and titles at stake, was anxious that adequate defen-
sive measures should be put quickly in hand, leading him to repeat an
earlier suggestion that he might recruit a larger military force for the
emperor, but this was not a specific proposal and it was not taken up.^7
Maximilian of Bavaria was equally anxious, and for the same reason. He
too had done very well out of the war but his new possessions and his
impressive status as an elector were also at risk should the tide turn deci-
sively against the Imperialists. Nevertheless he was a reluctant adherent
to Ferdinand’s cause. On the one hand he was bound to him by kin-
ship and their shared militant Catholicism, but on the other, as ruler of
one of the largest territories of the Empire, he had a vested interest in
limiting the effective power of the emperor. This led him to maintain a
relationship with Catholic but anti-Habsburg France during the Thirty
Years War, which although never quite becoming an effective alliance
allowed him to avoid total commitment to Ferdinand. Maximilian’s
diplomatic manoeuvres and contacts with France could not be kept
entirely secret, thus increasing the discomfort of Ferdinand’s position,
as the very limited strength of his own forces left his defence largely
dependent on Tilly’s army, which although nominally that of the
Catholic League was effectively controlled by Maximilian. The latter
in turn realised that this army might be insufficient in the event of a
concerted attack by the anti-Habsburg coalition, putting not only his
gains but also his own security at risk. Hence he urged Ferdinand to
raise troops, which he anticipated would be deployed to support Tilly,
and would thus come under his own overall control. Ferdinand had no
money to recruit or pay new regiments, let alone an army, although he
and his advisers recognised the need for additional forces, but preferably
under Imperial rather than Bavarian command. In the end it would be
Wallenstein who provided a solution to this problem, but during 1624