236 Notes to Pages 159–163- Information was compiled from vari ous sources: M. T. Kim, Koreiskie internat-
sionalisty, 77–79; Ku- Degai, Koreitsy, kniga 4, 69; and Interview with Khan Rem (son of
Khan Shen Gol and nephew of Khan Chan Gol). - Pak, Khan Myon Se, 25–26.
- Ku- Degai, Koreitsy, kniga 4, 5 6.
- Ku- Degai, Koreitsy, kniga 1, 121.
- Suturin, Delo kraevogo masshtaba, 188. Martin, “Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleans-
ing,” 855, reports that 73.7 percent of those arrested in the “national operations” during
1937–1938 were executed. - Khlevniuk, “Objectives of the Great Terror,” 172–73, and Khlevniuk, Master of
the House, 175–179. - Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 176.
- “Backwardness” was a trope for sedition that Brown saw repeatedly in the ar-
chives; Brown, Biography of No Place, 8 7. - Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolchak, 360. “Malcontents” because they re-
sisted Japa nese colonialism. - Soviet nationalities were to be constructed as “socio- historical groups” based on
contingent and malleable traits and characteristics. - RGIA- DV, f. 144, op. 5, d. 6, ll. 156–157, 184–187. Pages 184–187 contain profiles
on all the Japa nese compiled by the OGPU. For general information on intelligence gather-
ing, see Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence: Amer i ca’s Legendary Spymaster on the Funda-
mentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2006), passim. - Kuromiya and Mamoulia, “Anti- Russian and Anti- Soviet Subversion,” 1415–1438.
- Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, eds., Imperial Japan and National Identities in
Asia , 1895–1945, (London: Routledge- Curzon, 2003), and Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers,
and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japa nese War time Empire, 1931–1945 (Prince ton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1996). - Morley, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1868–1941, 245–249. Page 248 states: “ After the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, the army gradually usurped the powers of the
Foreign Ministry.” - Khlevniuk, “Objectives of the Great Terror,” 173, quoting V. Molotov, “ no vacil-
lation in the time of war and after the war.” - Ibid.
- “Vyselit so vsei territorii Dalne— Vostochnogo kraia... ,” Li and Kim, Belaia
kniga, 80. - Kuzin, Dalnevostochnye, 164. This is covered more in depth later in the chapter.
Alexander Kim of the Primore State Agricultural Acad emy, a professor of history, stated
that a small number of Soviet Koreans remained on North Sakhalin after 1937 under
NKVD protection. He did not elaborate on why they were under protection. See Alexander
Kim, e- mail to author, October 30, 2013. - Ken Kotani, e- mail to author, May 18, 2012. Kotani’s source is Masafumi Miki,
Kokkyo no Shokuminchi Karafuto [Sakhalin as a border colony] (Tokyo: Hanawa shobo, 2006). - Norman M. Naimark wrote, “ there was no reason to think that they [Koreans]
would be any less loyal during a war than the Rus sians, Uzbeks or Belarusians, who were
not attacked at all in the same way.” See Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 82. - Regarding Stalin as the absolute Soviet ruler, with the Politburo, Central Com-
mittee, and other commissions as mere sounding boards, see Khlevniuk, Master of the
House, 243.