301 FREDERICK AND WARwork of the men who direct the armies.' He did not intend that this
chronicle or any other should be read in a spirit of servile imitation,
for no two situations were ever exactly reproduced:' Past events serve
to feed the imagination and stock the memory. They are a fund of
ideas which provide the raw material which can then be refined and
tested by the exercise of judgment' (Oeuvres, IV, xv, xvii).
On the whole, Frederick's historical works reflect very favour-
ably on his honesty and competence as a writer. His reproduction of
numbers and dates is admittedly cavalier, and his treatment of
diplomacy is, as we might have supposed, somewhat less than candid.
At the same time he is just and generous to his enemies, merciless
towards many of his own military mistakes, and ever alive to his
obligations as a story-teller.
Frederick's knowledge of the campaigns of the remoter military
past was derived from his reading of the wars of Caesar, Gustavus
Adolphus, Montecuccoli, Turenne, Luxembourg, Eugene, and above
all Charles XII of Sweden, whose meteoric career was replete with
dreadful warnings.
Frederick began the process of making war when he drew up one of his
'projects of campaign'. He never varied in the matter of fundamental
principles. He claimed that in schemes of this kind the commander
must take due account of the nature of the theatre of operations, and
the numbers and quality of the rival troops. Military calculations
alone were insufficient, for the belligerents might be able to call on
the help of allies: 'Hence these projects of campaign are of value only
so far as they are in accordance with the political scene' ('Essai' for
the Chevalier de Courten, 28 February 1745, PC 1738; see also 'Article
II, Des Projetsde Campagne', in 'Principes Gen6raux', 1748, Oeuvres,
XXVIII, 8; 'Pensees', 1755, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 123). The commander
must conceive his operations on a grand scale, like Prince Eugene,
which in the case of Prussia indicated an ultimate drive to the
Danube near Vienna. However, it was prudent at every stage to
project oneself into the mind of the hostile commander, and face the
question 'What design would I be forming if I were the enemy?'
('Principes G6n6raux\ 1748, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 41).
Frederick also adhered throughout his military career to the
maxim he established for himself in the Antimachiavel: 'It is an
incontestable truth that it is better to forestall the enemy, than to
find yourself anticipated by him.' In part Frederick wished to avert
the danger of being overtaken by an enemy offensive, and reduced to
fighting a defensive war on his own territory, which was unsuited for
the purpose. More positively, he desired to make use of the unique
war-readiness of the Prussian army.