303 FREDERICK AND WARgoing to be a long one, and that he would have to take drastic
measures to stave off his defeat at the hands of the gathering enemy
alliance. His celebrated strategy of interior lines was first put into
effect in the campaign of Rossbach and Leuthen. It was a potent
multiplier of forces, and Frederick could not have survived without it
(PC 9393, 10559, 10910, 12961, 12995, 13390; Massenbach, 1808, I,
117), but he never regarded it as anything more than an undesirable
expedient, corresponding directly to the unfavourable case of a war
against a powerful alliance, as outlined in the Principes Giniraux of
1748:
in such an eventuality we must know... when it is timely to
cede ground, sacrificing a province to one of our enemies, while
marching with all our forces against the others, and putting
forth our ultimate effort to destroy them. Afterwards we can
make our detachments. Wars of this kind ruin our armies
through exhaustion and hard marching, and if they last for any
length of time they will bring us to a bad end. (Oeuvres,
XXVIII, 16; see also 'Reflexions', 1758, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 164; PC
12995; Catt, 1884, 148)
In some further strategic dimensions, the Frederician battle fell
short of the Napoleonic practice, and indeed of some of the maxims
he laid down in his own writings. He stipulated in the Principes
G6n6raux: 'It is an ancient rule of war, and I am just repeating it-if
you separate your forces you will be beaten in detail. When you give
battle you must concentrate all the troops you can-you cannot find a
better use for them' (Oeuvres, XXVIII, 36). Through miscalculation
he had already allowed himself to be surprised by the Austrians at
Chotusitz and Soor when his forces were divided. The lesson appeared
to have sunk home, and yet in the Seven Years War we discover that
Keith was left in command of powerful detached forces while
Frederick was fighting at Lobositz, Prague and Kolin. Retzow was
absent when Frederick came under attack at Hochkirch, and Prince
Henry remained with nearly half the army at Schmottseiffen when
his brother was being routed at Kunersdorf. Accident and carelessness
account to some degree for this startling gulf between theory and
practice. Laubert (1900, 119) goes on to suggest that the value of
numerical superiority was not appreciated at this period in warfare,
which seems to go against the clear message of the Principes. More
likely, as Caemmerer indicates, there was no point in heaping up
more and more men in a single locality, at a time when armies were
not yet broken down into handy semi-permanent corps and divisions
in the Napoleonic style: