the disintegration of the empire 85
political condition which the sultan demanded in exchange for granting
the genoese request.111
the principal concession which alberto spinola’s team of negotia-
tors accepted features at the very start of the treaty, immediately after
the guarantee of safety to the republic’s merchants in mamluk ports: the
genoese undertake not to interfere in maritime trade in any way, not
even when the sultan is on campaign in syria—a tricky situation for any
head of state.112 With these few ill-chosen words, genoa not only gave the
sultan a free hand on dry land but tied its own hands at sea!
the first clause of the treaty, seemingly entirely inoffensive, guaran-
tees that genoese merchants will have safety and security in all territo-
ries which the sultan currently holds, and in all those which he may later
acquire.113 Knowing that his blessing would be fixed in writing, alberto
spinola gave prior approval on behalf of the republic for all future mam-
luk conquests.
By thus formally disengaging from the fray, genoa not only sealed the
fate of the remaining crusader positions in the eastern mediterranean, but
also threw away the last of the advantages won for it by Benedetto Zac-
caria’s heroic efforts.114 their steadfast ally, cilician armenia, was handed
over unconditionally for the sultan to do with as he would: shortly after
the fall of acre, King hethum ii rightly considered that his country was
111 this omission is down to ibn ‛abd al-Ẓāhir’s tendency to present the treaty as a mer-
ciful concession on the part of the sultan, which it was not: “the latin text of Qalāwūn’s
instrument [.. .] bears the marks of a bilateral treaty” (holt, “treaty,” p. 104).
112 Belgrano, “trattato,” p. 168: Et precepit dominus soldanus quod pro suo itu in exercitu
in Siria vel in alia parte, nec per suo messaticos vel mercatores nauigantes vel per aliquam
aliam causam, non possit detineri vel impediri aliqua nauis vel galea, nec alia ligna ullomodo
non possint esse detenti. the first editor of the treaty, sylvestre de sacy, remarked in 1827
that its “barbarous style” did not obscure the meaning at all, which is further explicated by
pistarino, “genova,” p. 144: the clause stipulates “che il commercio marittimo non dovesse
subire interruzione alcuna se il sultano fosse in campo aperto contra siria.”
113 Belgrano, “trattato,” pp. 167–168: [.. .] in omnibus terris domini soldani quas habet nec
[sic] de cetero acquisierit in mari et in terra.
114 marino sanudo held the genoese directly responsible for the fall of acre, the last
significant crusader position (though venetian-dominated), little more than a year after
the genoese-mamluk treaty was concluded (sanudo/monticolo, col. 578; papacostea,
“gênes,” p. 230 note 68); this venetian view of events might be suspected as partisan, but
is confirmed by an arabic chronicler from the mamluk sultanate, ibn al-furāt (ehrenk-
reutz, “implications,” p. 342; caro, Genua, ii, p. 133, concludes pithily: “somit gab genua
die letzten Besitzungen in syrien dem Untergange preis.” according to an eastern source
(Bar hebraeus/Budge, pp. 492–493) the mamluk sultan did not attack acre until he heard
news of arghun’s death, which indeed happened in the same year.