The Noble Servitor and the Petrine State 129military service become permanent for its noble classes'. (^47) Let us add that this
was not a steadily intensifying relationship but rather one that ebbed and flowed
as the years went by. Nevertheless the degree to which Russian society was
militarized by the end of Peter's reign is remarkable and set a μai.l~rn for
the future. To comprehend the full impact of the tsar-reformer's policies we
have to consider the actions he took to provide for the army's material support.
The Great Northern War led indirectly to a fundamental recasting of the
Muscovite administrative and fiscal system. Some of the institutional changes
made at this time, such as the introduction of the provinces (gubernil) and the
poll tax, were destined to endure for generations. The first of these reforms
were impromptu responses to military necessity and their unexpected results
can to some degree be blamed on external circumstances; but even after 1715,
when Peter began to grapple seriously with problems of government, the con-
sequences of his actions were often little short of disastrous. In his concern
with long-term ends he overlooked the human factor. Much of the trouble
stemmed from the simple fact that his new army was too large and costly for
a country with limited resources, so that whatever was done to accommodate
its needs was bound to impose unduly heavy burdens on the populace.
Already in the seventeenth century, as we know, the voivode had exercised
both military and civil authority within his district (uyezd). But command of
the local troops was not usually his principal concern unless he were appointed
to a frontier area-or unless he were faced with some emergency such as
a rebellion. It was different with the governors (gubernatory) whom Peter
appointed-Menshikov was given charge of Ingria from 1703-since they were
preoccupied with military and naval matters, above all the provision of
recruits and war supplies. They exercised more power than the officials of the
central government, which by 1708 had fallen to pieces. The country was in
effect now divided into several satrapies whose chiefs seldom resided in them.
The tsar tried to co-ordinate their actions by correspondence, but his attention
was fixed elsewhere.^48 The governor of each province was supposed to have a
staff: an ober-komissar to collect revenue, an ober-proviant to receive
deliveries in kind, an ober-komendant in charge of specifically military affairs,
and a landrikhter to administer justice. These arrangements suggest specializ-
ation of function and even a formal 'division of powers', but in the cir-
cumstances it is obvious that these agencies would be dominated by the military
element-that is, if they came into existence at all. In practice the hard-pressed
governor simply chose a deputy who did whatever his chief demanded of
47 Givens, 'Servitors or Seigneurs', p. 14.
48 The actual state of affairs is well brought out in Milyukov's classic study of 1892, Gos. khoz.
Rossii; his main arguments are summarized in Miliukov, A. Seignobos and L. Eisenmann,
Histoire de Russie (Paris, 1932), i. 328-35, 350-5, 362-9 (Eng. tr. pp. 259-64, 275-9, 285-304).
Another fundamental early study, written from a similar viewpoint, is Bogoslovsky, Obi. reforma,
which can now be supplemented by C. Peterson's excellent Peter the Great's Admin. and Judicial
Reforms ... (Stockholm, 1979).