Moscow's Men 011 Horseback 15defence, adopled similar solutions imlependenlly. Afler all, the concept of
universal service was common to a number of ancienl and orien1al poli1ies,
which <l'!'!elopcd monarchie~. ncbi!itic~. ~n<l ~nncd force:; in bioa<l~y cor.ipar-
able ways; and most religions have accommodated lhemselvcs fairly readily lo
the notion thal ii is vinuous to bear arms and risk dealh for lhe 'common good'
as defined by lhe political power. More specifically, Muscoviles could read in
their chronicles that Kiev an Rus', too, had been a war-like society, and I hat its
fall had been due lo biller feuding among its princes; memories of this lragedy,kept alive by lhe Church, helped (^10) make the demands of the new vfas( seem
more acceplable.^7
In i1s concrele paniculars, al any rate, the Russian service s1a1e was lhc fruil
of harsh experience, above all in lrying to pro1ec1 1he long s1eppe fronlier
against Tatar attack. fl is important to sec lhis problem in the contexl of 1he
aulhorities' overall 'defence posture'. In effect Muscovy had two foreign and
military policies, one eastern and one weslcrn, which were not adequately co-
ordinated until lhe mid-sevenleenlh ce111ury. Whelher this was 1he producl of
circumstance or of a failure lo decide priorilies realistically is open to debate.
fl is certainly a curious paradox 1ha1, allhough lhe slcppe 'front' was lhe mos
vulnerable, and fighting wenl on along ii almosl withoul interruplion, it rarely
held first place among 1he leaders' preoccupal ions. As a rule their eyes were
fixed on relations with lhe Wesl. The lsardom's main objec1ive, 1hey 1hough1,
should be 10 recover from Li1huania and Poland (uni1ed in a Commonwealth
from 1569) 1hose lands inhabited by Onhodox eastern Slavs 1hat had once
formed part of lhe Kievan realm. Yel lhis was a mailer of preslige ralher lhan
a slrategic necessily, whereas in 1he casl Muscovy faced a life-and-dealh slrugglc
against the other 'successor slales' lo lhe Kipchak Horde.
This confronlalion wilh lhe Crimean and Nogay khanales was forced upon
her by the fact lhal these hordes were not reconciled lo Muscovy's hard-won
independence and considered her !heir legi1ima1e prey. To further 1heir claims
to sovereignly, and also to ob1ain the slaves vi1al 10 the mainlenance of their
mainly nomadic, parasi1ic, and war-like politics, they launched continual raids
on Muscovite tcrrilory. The firsl recorded allack took place in 1468; 8
!hereafter they occurred almosl annually. The skilful diplomacy of Ivan III
(1462-1505) secured somelhing of a respilc until 1504, bul 1hen lhe poli1ical
cons1ellation changed, partly because of Muscovi1e encroachmenl on the
Kazan' khanate. During lhe first half of lhc sixlecn1h cenlllry a total of forty-
three raids were recorded, the mosl serious of them in 1507, 1512, 1521, 1531,
and 1541.^9 Von Herberslein, who wi1nessed 1he attack of 1521, relates 1ha
(^7) RLiss, Adel, p. 7, goes so rar as 10 speak or 'the tlr11zhi11a IKievan princely armed retinue!
character or the Muscovite polity'.
8 Fisher, 'Crimean Tatars, pp. 26-7. who comments: 'Viewed from a less emotional or national-
istic perspective, rhese slave raids can Ile ~een as a very \Uccessful economic activity that produced
means by which the Tatars developed a lively urhan and cultural society.' This is lo take revi-
sionism 100 far.
~ Kargalov, 'Oborona', p. 141; id., Nu .\/t'fmoy xru1111w. pp. 39, 43, 56-67, 80, too.