The Praetorian Option 265Wittgenstein, commander of the Second Army in the south, was set in a differ-
ent mould. The liberal V. F. Rayevsky wrote later that, despite his non-Russian
background, 'he was loved and respected by all'.^70 He left administration largely
to his chief of staff, General P. D. Kiselev. Both men may be categorized as
'patrons'. Later Kiselev became a loyal (and effective) minister of Nicholas I,
but at this time he played along with the dissidents. He allowed his house to be
used as a conspiratorial meeting-place and replaced a number of the more
objectionable regimental commanders by men of his own choice.^71 One of
these individuals was Colonel I. G. Burtsev, a secret society member, who
represented the 'southerners' at the 1821 Moscow conference. He disapproved
of Pester' s radicalism and according to some accounts tried to exclude his
rival from the Southern Society.^72 Whether this was so or not, Pester retained
control of the organization, aided by his dual responsibilities as a staff officer
at army headquarters and CO of the Vyatka infantry regiment. This unit was
based not far away at Lintsy, an estate belonging to a Polish landowner,
Prince Eustachy Sanguszko. Some other properties in the region were owned
by Russian officers. They offered convenient conspiratorial venues, as did the
fairs which officers attended in the line of duty (mainly to purchase horses) as
well as the annual manoeuvres that were held in anticipation of war with the
Turks. The Southern Society was able to set up two subordinate cells, one at
Kamenka (Major-General S. G. Volkonsky, Colonel [retired] V. L. Davydov),
and the other at Vasirkov (Lieutenant-Colonel S. I. Murav'yev-Apostol, CO
of the Chernigov regiment).^73 The latter was a former officer of the Semenovsky
guards regiment who bitterly resented its disbandment, which had caused him
to be transferred to a unit of the line.
· -,, The 'southerners! did more than their comrades in the north to win their
men's sympathy, by humane treatment and setting up schools, and were better
at conspiratorial technique. A concern for secrecy came naturally to Pester,
who was preoccupied with the preparation of a draft republican constitution.
This, as is well known, envisaged a provisional revolutionary dictatorship, in
which Pester clearly expected to play the principal role. Most Northern Society
members found this prospect unpalatable. They had an opportunity to ven-
tilate their objections in the spring of 1824, when Pester was again sent to the
capital on a mission. His draft (still incomplete) of Russkaya pravda did not
win their approval. There is some evidence, however, that certain leaders (Col-
onel S. P. Trubetskoy and Lieutenant E. P. Obolensky) may have subsequently
moved toward a more radical position.^74 The ideological breach was not
10 [Rayevsky) 'Vospominaniya', p. 84.
11 Lorer, Zapiski, p. 78; Yakushkin, Zapiski, pp. 36, 536-9; on Kiselev sec Leyev,
'Doreformennaya armiya' (based on his papers but uninformative as to his opinions).
72 Yakushkin, Zapiski, pp. 36, 161; Mazour, First Russ. Revol .. pp. 84, 98.
7J The group at Kishinev, headquarters of 16th division, was no longer of great consequence.
Luciani, Soci~r~. pp. 171-3. _
74 VD i. 107-32; Druzhinin, Murav'yev, pp. 139-43; Mazour, First Russ. Revol., pp. 119, 121,
128-9.