Gentlemen to Officerssolute (as is sometimes implied), for Pester himself, disenchanted at the
ol reception given to his ideas, was moderating his stand-at least for tactical
asons. He later told investigators that he had feared the disagreements would
~aken the movement.^7 ~ Testimony given under pressure is of course suspect,
1t there is reason to believe that Pester was teiiing the truth, fur ht: 11<t1i1cd
veral associates in the vain hope of earning the authorities' indulgence. His
:count of the group's tactical plans is also plausible: they saw the former
:menovtsy as a potential nucleus of supporters,. who would back a coup; this
e conspirators hoped to bring off in the summer of 1826, when the tsar was
1e to attend manoeuvres in the south.
Did they intend to assassinate him? The investigators insisted that they did,
id the evidence on this score, although inconclusive, cost Pestel' his life.
ertainly he had no objection on principle-his writings are explicit on the
atter-but one must emphasize the point that the plotters, for all their
aborately detailed schemes concerning Russia's future, were remarkably
ragmatic, indeed light-hearted, about the methods they intended to employ to
ttain their goals. If required to decide promptly, they would probably have
pted for violence on grounds of expediency. Had they been given time for
:flcction, they might well have rejected terrorism.
An obsession with ultimate ends, to the neglect of means, was characteristic
f revolutionary movements in this era. Another sign of immaturity was the
iystification with which the Russian conspirators, like those elsewhere, liked
J surround their activities. They would, for example, exaggerate their own
trength in order to impress initiates or rivals, and perhaps just to keep up their
pirits. In the long run such fraudulent practices were counter-productive. The
arm they could do was particularly evident in the negotiations held in August-
;eptember 1825, during army manoeuvres, at Leshchin (a village near Zhito-
nir), between leaders of the Southern Society and those of another group, the
Society of United Slavs', which had come into being independently.
This organization grew out of a circle led by two sub-lieutenants in the 8th
\rtillery Brigade, the brothers P. I. and A. I. Borisov. It consisted almost
vhoUy of subaltern officers (the only senior man was a major) and by this time
tad 51 members, probably more than were in the Southern Society. The latter,
:specially Lieutenant-Colonel S. I. Murav'yev-Apostol and his close friend,
)uh-Lieutenant M. R. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, were eager to bring about a merger-
)Ut only on their own terms. They recognized that the United Slavs' links with
Polish patriots and other activists abroad could prove valuable, but they were
llso alarmed by the more militant tendencies of the United Slavs. These dif-
ferences were important, but should not be inflated.^76 Each group approached
7l VD iv. 92; confirmed by Lorer, Zapiski, p. 79.
76 Historians have tended to interpret the difference ideologically. so confusing the mailer.
Nechkina's 1927 monograph, Ohshchestl'o ob ·yedinennykh slav ·_van, represented the group as
'democrats' opposed to an 'aristocratic' military coup: cf. B. E. Syroyechkovsky et al .. notes to
Gorbachevsky, Zapiski, p. J 10. This is the principal source on the negotiations between the two
bodies. His evidence is judiciously evaluated both in this edition and by Luciani, Societe.