Marking Time 325two-and-a-half-year struggle cost about half a million soldiers' lives-three-
quarters as many as during the whole period from 1789 to 1815.^6
Was Nicholas's reign then one of military disaster, brought on by his own
misguided policies? This w35 thl' vit>w t:ikt>n hy 1;omt> 1·ri1i,_., ;if1er hi~ deR!h,
when policy matters could be discussed in public with greater freedom. There
was a natural tendency to cast the tsar as scapegoat, much as Stalin would be
nearly one hundred years later. 'Magnificent, but all a mi,take': Nikitenko's
celebrated assessment of the reign should not blind one to its positive ad1ieve-
ments, even if the overall judgement cannot but be negative. It is true that
these accomplishments were often the work, not of the tsar personally, who
was fond of shelving awkward decisions, but of subordinates who had to over-
come obstruction in high places. On the whole this was a period of marking
time-which is not a synonym for immobility, but implies an accumulation of
energy in preparation for a new step forward.
There is no doubt that Nicholas sincerely loved his troops, and that his
efforts to better their lot were not so fruitless as his brother's had been. He and
his aides also gave a great deal of thought to various improvements in military
administration which at least pointed the way towards more substantial
changes in the following reign. It is a paradox of the Nicolaevan era that the
efforts made to preserve and consolidate existing structures actually laid the
groundwork for them to be dismantled. This was as true in the military
domain as it was in the field of general social and economic policy. The liberal
emigre N. I. Turgenev dismissed the tsar's principal measures in the sphere of
military reform as mere palliatives.^7 He was right, but only in the short term.
Their implications went deeper. Moreover, a new generation of experienced
and well-educated officers was rising to the surface. It would be stretching a
point to call them liberals, but they were critical of the arbitrariness and chaos
that lay hidden beneath the apparently orderly exterior of military life. They
sensed that reforms were essential, even if only to ensure the monarchy's sur-
vival. Though slighted under Nicholas's heavy hand, these 'cadres' were able
to implement much of their programme after 1855.
For the tsar the men in the ranks were 'the subject of Our constant heartfell
aspirations',^8 but this did not mean that they were treated humanely, as
responsible individuals with natural rights. Concretely, three things were done
on their behalf. First, the recruitment system was modified, and the terms of
service alleviated, in order to build up a trained reserve. Second, various steos
were taken to improve the troops' material well-being, and also that of their
dependants. Third, the quality of the officers set over them was improved by
h Bogdanovich, /st. ocherk, i. 173-4, as revised by Besltuhcv. "h:ry1mkaya voyna', p. 196;
er. Curtiss, Crimean War. p. 471 and, for !he earlier figure, Bc,kro\11)y <'I al., "Bilan demo-
graphique', p. 134. A con1cr11ious prdinuna1 y 'ludy of Crimean War ,a,uallic' ''a' Ol>ruchev.
- tmanka', 2, pp. 429-76, esp. pp. 436, 4W.
(^7) Turgenev, Lu Russie, p. 308. ~ II PSL xi(i), 9141 (7 !\lay 1836).