indication of their country’s po liti cal isolation.^71 The episode was partly
due to the absence of relations between Israel and countries in Asia. By
1955, only seven Asian countries had recognized Israel, and out of these,
fi ve had Israeli legations, and the fi rst Israeli embassy in Asia was estab-
lished in Rangoon in 1957, after Bandung.^72 In April 1955, none of the
Asian countries had a resident mission in Israel.
For India, the whole episode underscored Pakistan’s role in shaping
its Israel policy. At Bandung, it formally acknowledged and bowed to
Pakistani dictates. It was the Pakistani factor that precluded Nehru from
normalizing ties with Israel. Despite all his commitments to dialogue,
in de pen dence, and the moral high ground, when it came to the Arab-
Israeli confl ict, Nehru often fought with Pakistan and succumbed to its
po liti cal pressures. Menon was rather candid and conceded to Brecher
that the Arabs “wouldn’t come to dinner” with the Israelis and would not
sit with Israel anywhere except in the United Nations.^73 For him, Paki-
stan only “makes anti- Israeli speeches.” This made things diffi cult for
Nehru. India could not be indiff erent to Pakistan as other states could,
because the Rus sians “can aff ord to have somebody in Israel because they
are a big power. We have got Pakistan on our borders, and the West sup-
ports Pakistan, and we cannot go and create more enemies than we have
at the present moment.”^74 As the years went by, Pakistan began to occupy
a prime place in India’s Israel policy. Its defi ance of the West over issues
such as the recognition of communist China, the Suez crisis, Hungary,
Czech o slo vak i a, and Af ghan i stan could not be imitated vis-à- vis Pakistan
over Israel.
Bandung symbolized both Israel’s exclusion from the emerging group
of newly in de pen dent states and underscored its isolation from Asia. Ma-
jor countries such as India and China started moving away from Israel,
and the smaller ones, such as Burma, were unable to withstand the pres-
sures exerted upon them. For both India and China, the Arab world of-
fered better po liti cal opportunities, especially over the issues that were
critical for them at the United Nations, namely the Kashmir dispute for
India and UN membership for China.
It is diffi cult to say whether this bitter experience pushed Israel closer
to Eu rope, but post- Bandung, Israel turned its back on Asia. In the wake
of the Sinai war and adverse Asian reactions, Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion was unapologetic about his priorities. In terms of Israel’s inter-
est, “the friendship of one Eu ro pe an nation [namely, France] which we
have secured from July [1956] until the present [January 1957] is worth
nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964 195