war which would ill- serve the Arab countries.... I drafted a message
from the Prime Minister to President Nasser pointing out the gravity
of the situation and urging that Israel should not be given a pretext
for going to war.... In the light of subsequent developments I have
often regretted that we did not send that message and I have blamed
myself for not pursuing further the proposal with [Foreign Minister]
Chagla and with the Prime Minister.^25When and as offi cial papers become public, one will fi nd more evidence
of internal disagreements. Undeniably, there was substantial opposition
to the offi cial policy.
The widespread disapproval of offi cial policy, however, should not be
considered support for the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza
Strip, and Sinai Peninsula. Criticisms of the offi cial policy were accom-
panied by a strong disapproval of Israeli actions. Even right- wing parties
such as the Jan Sangh were not silent. As Craig Baxter observes, when it
comes to the Middle East,
the Jana Sangh opposed the openly pro- Arab position of the Govern-
ment of India. It called on the Arabs to recognize and negotiate with
Israel but said that Israel should recognize its place in Afro- Asia, work
with the Afro- Asians in scientifi c and technological cooperation, and not
be “an instrument to western diplomacy.” Israel should withdraw its
forces from occupied Arab territories and should work to resettle the
refugees.^26Their primary complaint was the absence of “balance” in the offi cial pol-
icy. As highlighted by the watered- down INC resolution and Chagla’s re-
marks, this was true even for a section of the Congress Party and the
foreign offi ce.
The anti- Israeli stance adopted by the Indian government on the eve
of the June war took a turn for the worse when Indian units of the UNEF
faced the initial Israeli onslaught. The contingent had come to maintain
peace between Egypt and Israel, got caught in the crossfi re, and started
taking casualties. By the time Israel completed its capture of the Gaza
Strip, fi ve Indian soldiers were killed and scores injured. India not only
had a large presence in the UNEF^27 but also contributed “a Chief of Staff
from April 1958 to February 1960 and two commanders Lt. Gen. Prem
Singh Gyani from February 1960 to 1964 and [Maj. Gen. Inder Jit Rikhye]
the years of hardened hostility, 1964–1984 207