“We have not made our mark in the world by being cautious. We have
made our mark in the world by taking a fi rm stand where justice was con-
cerned.”^17 Following the war, the offi cial position toward the war was sum-
marized by Chagla, in a statement to the parliament on July 18: (1) it was
not open to a country to start a war merely because it feels that a threat to
its security exists, (2) no aggressor should be permitted to retain the fruits
of its aggression, (3) it was not permissible for a country to acquire the ter-
ritory of another state in order to be able to bargain from a position of
strength, and (4) rights could not be established and territorial disputes
cannot be settled through armed confl ict.^18 These positions became perti-
nent when the UN Security Council (with India as a member) was deliber-
ating the text of UN Resolution 242, adopted on November 22.^19
Despite claims to the contrary, India’s offi cial policy did not enjoy the
unanimous support of the Congress Party, parliament, the press, or the
wider public.^20 The resolution adopted by the All- India Congress Com-
mittee on June 23 revealed internal divisions within the governing party.
While expressing its concern and anxiety over the “recent developments
which escalated into a war,” it did not condemn Israel. This was in con-
trast to the offi cial position, which had condemned Israel even before the
fi rst shots were fi red.^21 Likewise, the statements of the government did
not refer to “recent developments”— something the opposition wanted
the government to take note of before condemning Israel. Furthermore,
the AICC resolution did not refer to the killing of Indian soldiers, which
Prime Minister Gandhi repeatedly highlighted to shore up support for
the government in parliament.^22 Underscoring the internal divisions
within the party, Chagla conceded: “I found that not only the opposition
but even a section of our own party was opposed to our policy.”^23 A
public- opinion survey conducted in July 1967 revealed large- scale disap-
proval of the government’s policy toward the June war.^24
Sections of the Indian foreign offi ce had serious reservations over the
pro- Arab policy of the government. C. S. Jha, India’s foreign secretary
(permanent undersecretary in the ministry), was unusually candid in his
memoirs, which were published more than a de cade after the June war,
when views sympathetic toward Israel were po liti cally controversial. But
Jha admitted:
I felt that as a sincere friend of Egypt we should advise Nasser to rest
on the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Sinai and to go
slow over the closing of the Straits of Tiran so as to avoid a disastrous206 the years of hardened hostility, 1964–1984