- Since the mid- 1930s, Indian leaders had explained and justifi ed
their support for the Arabs in secular terms (as opposed to the religious
logic of the Muslim League and, later on, Pakistan). Thus the Rabat
fi asco was a setback to that logic. - The primary motive of the two sponsors, Saudi Arabia and Morocco,
was to consolidate the defeat of Nasser and his brand of secular Arab nation-
alism, a principal plank of India’s Middle East policy since the mid- 1950s. - The Rabat conference underscored the emergence of Islamocentric
politics (as opposed to Nasser’s brand of secular Arab socialism) in the
Middle East, and India was responding to these winds of change. Unfor-
tunately, it could not be as vociferous as Pakistan. Thus its attempts in
that direction proved counterproductive. - The Rabat episode was not unique. India had faced a similar humili-
ation at the World Muslim Conference in Somalia in December 1964.^59 - It was ironic that while India was keen to participate, two secular
regimes in the region, Ba’athist Iraq and Syria, chose to stay away.
One thing was certain. India wanted to be at Rabat to counter Pakistan
and present itself as a steadfast champion of the Palestinians. With the
rapid raise of religious conservatism in the Middle East, it would have
been prudent to abandon its secular framework in favor of the Islamic
paradigm. India sought instead to gain some support in the Islamic world
by presenting the al- Aqsa incident through a secular framework. This
strategy misfi red.
For much of the time, the Rabat conference was bogged down in re-
solving Indo- Pakistan tensions over Muslim repre sen ta tion. Refl ecting
on this irony, The Washington Post remarked that the Indo- Pakistani
“confl ict plunged the Islamic Summit Conference into disarray and set
back Arab hopes of rallying the world’s 500 million Muslims to support
the Arab cause against Israel.”^60 The conference almost collapsed over
Indian participation, and India’s secular credentials were dented irrepa-
rably. There are still voices within India that advocate institutional link-
ages with and even membership in the OIC.^61
The Bangladesh War, 1971 and After
The Indo- Pakistan war of 1971 provided an opportunity for the
government to test Arab goodwill. The civil- war situation that persisted
214 the years of hardened hostility, 1964–1984