prelude to normalization 233unable to carry the course to its logical conclusion. There were factors
that facilitated some tangible moves toward Israel. But there were also
forces that worked in the opposite direction. These in turn prevented him
from proceeding toward Israel. One can identify four closely linked im-
pediments to normalizing relations with Israel.
Impediments to Normalization
The outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in December 1987 was a
major deterrent against any Indian rapprochement toward Israel. The
uprising eroded traditional support for the Jewish state even among lib-
eral elements the world over and evoked universal condemnation. Be-
nevolent or humane occupation ceased to be acceptable to the vast major-
ity of international community, and the intifada reiterated the centrality
of the Palestinian problem in Middle East politics. Given its historical
disposition, India’s sympathy and support for the Palestinians was inevi-
table. Another outcome of the intifada was the Algiers Declaration of
November 15, 1988, in which the PLO declared its belated ac cep tance of
the 1947 partition plan and proclaimed the “state of Palestine.” India be-
came one of the fi rst countries to recognize the move and received PLO
Chairman Yasser Arafat as a head of state. The intifada also infl uenced
India’s refusal to play the Davis Cup relegation playoff tennis match in
Israel in April 1988.^36
In addition, a pro- Israeli policy remains unlikely to win elections in
India.^37 For economic, po liti cal, ideological, and religious reasons, a pro-
Palestinian stance has a strong base of support. While communal calcu-
lations play a very important role, a pro- Palestinian policy enjoys wide-
spread support in India. The same does not hold for a pro- Israeli policy.
Support for closer ties with Israel comes from a variety of interest groups,
such as pro- Western, anticommunist, Hindu and Sikh fundamentalists,
anti- Muslim elements, socialists, idealists, or realists. Individually or col-
lectively, none of these groups ever had suffi cient infl uence to alter the
policy. Domestic po liti cal dividends for normalization has always been
marginal and unattractive. On the contrary, unless handled judiciously,
the potential po liti cal fallout would be enormous for any po liti cal party or
government. For the opposition groups, normalization was largely a po-
liti cal tool against the Congress Party. Since the days of the partition, the
socialists, for example, periodically harped on the need for close ties with