240 n ormalization and after
Second, the end of bloc politics and the Kuwait war of 1991 improved
Israel’s diplomatic fortunes. The weakening of the Soviet Union meant
that the Arab states lost their patron and their counterweight to Ameri-
can support for Israel. The military option became less viable for coun-
tries such as Syria. Po liti cal negotiations, not military confrontation,
with Israel became the new slogan. The Middle East Peace Conference,
which began in Madrid on October 30, 1991, signaled an Arab willing-
ness to seek a negotiated settlement with Israel. Even the Palestinian
leadership was not averse to a compromise solution. This relaxed atmo-
sphere vis-à- vis Israel was refl ected in the desire of major powers such
as the Soviet Union and China to reassess their hostilities and normal-
ize ties with Israel. While Moscow renewed its relations in October 1991,
China recognized the Jewish state in January 1992.^5 India could not re-
main indiff erent to this newly found international rapprochement with
Israel.
Third, the Palestinian factor, a key element in India’s Middle East
policy for over sixty years, was considerably weakened. The Palestinian
support for President Saddam Hussein of Iraq during his invasion, oc-
cupation, and annexation of Kuwait proved costly. Key Arab states such
as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia perceived this as a sign of betrayal and in-
gratitude.^6 The regional importance of the PLO waned considerably, and
while Arab states were still supportive of the Palestinian cause, they were
less willing to endorse its leadership, especially Yasser Arafat.^7 It was no
longer possible for India to further its interests in the Middle East by
playing up its “consistent” support to Arafat. Fourth, the unfolding Mid-
dle East peace pro cess was a major post– cold war development. The will-
ingness of the Arabs and Israel to seek a po liti cal settlement through di-
rect negotiations was groundbreaking, and many countries were eager to
play a part. India was no exception. But its ability to play any role in the
Middle East peace pro cess depended upon its willingness to establish
normal relations with all the parties to the Arab- Israeli confl ict, includ-
ing Israel.^8 To avoid being left out of the pro cess, New Delhi announced
its decision within days of the Chinese move.^9
Fifth, the domestic situation within India was favorable to Israel. Do-
mestic po liti cal calculations had long infl uenced India’s Israel policy. The
principal opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), had been a
staunch supporter of the normalization, and this in turn ensured greater
po liti cal support for Rao. In the words of Efraim Inbar, the ascendance of
the BJP “removed some hesitations about Israel.”^10 Moreover, during the
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