242 n ormalization and aftersafe to conclude that security was one of the factors that infl uenced Rao
to normalize ties with Israel.
Finally, Rao’s decision appears to be a well- conceived plan aimed at
seeking balance and pragmatism in Indian foreign policy. By becoming a
prisoner of its rhetoric, it had divorced itself from po liti cal reality. “Con-
sistency” was its guiding principle regarding the turbulent Middle East.
It extended po liti cal support for the Arab and Islamic countries of the
region without demanding or ensuring reciprocity. Even the po liti cal and
military support some of these countries gave to Pakistan during the
1965 and 1971 wars did not result in any modifi cation. Normalization was
partly aimed at remedying this anomalous situation. Shortly after the
establishment of relations, India’s foreign secretary,^14 J. N. Dixit, publicly
retorted: “What have the Arabs given us, if I may ask? Did they vote for us
in the Kashmir issue? Were they supportive of us when we had the East
Pakistan crisis [in 1971]?”^15 In the past, such harsh words came only from
opposition- party leaders who were highly critical of the offi cial policy on
Israel.^16 Some Arab countries were not happy with the Indian move, but
normalization did not evoke any adverse response from the region. Con-
trary to past fears and apprehensions, newly established relations with
Israel enabled India to pursue productive ties with a number of countries
in the region. Growing bilateral relations with countries such as Iran and
Saudi Arabia indicate that Indo- Israeli normalization did not inhibit
Middle Eastern countries from seeking and improving their relations
with India. On the contrary, Indo- Israeli relations forced key states of the
Middle East to take India seriously. Not everyone, however, was happy with
Rao’s decision.
Internal Criticisms Continue
Support for normalization was overwhelming but not unani-
mous. A vast majority took a sober view of the prevailing world order, but
there were voices of dissent that longed for the past. Having grown up
with a heavy and often unverifi ed historical legacy, they were not prepared
to accept normalization easily. What were their principal criticisms?
It was hasty. Signifi cant segments of the Indian intelligentsia were un-
able and unwilling to recognize and appreciate the need for close po liti cal
relations with Israel. They viewed normalization as an aberration and
betrayal of the traditional commitment to the Palestinian cause. According