266 c o n c l u s i o n
As a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, British
India could not ignore the Islamic dimension of the problem. The Con-
gress Party sought to expand its support among Muslims and counter the
eff orts of the Muslim League by adopting pro- Muslim and pro- Arab posi-
tions on the Middle East. The Congress Party, however, projected this pro-
Arab policy through secular rationales. Anticolonialism, anti- imperialism,
and opposition to religion- based nationalism became its main arguments
regarding the yishuv.
This Congress Party– Muslim League rivalry took a diff erent turn after
- Contrary to the expectations of the historian and future diplomat
K. M. Panikkar, free India did not adopt a “Hindu” view toward Zionism,
if this had ever been feasible. It still had a large Muslim population, and
Israel became a Middle Eastern pawn in the Indo- Pakistan rivalry. If the
Congress Party was competing with the Muslim League in the past, now
the competition operated at two levels. Domestically, the support of the
Muslim population was essential not only for the electoral success of
the Congress Party but also to maintain its secular credentials vis-à- vis
the Hindu nationalist parties on the right. Externally, India was compet-
ing with Pakistan for po liti cal favors from the Islamic countries, espe-
cially over the Kashmir dispute. To complicate matters, Nehru had to deal
with Israel’s regional isolation, India’s strong po liti cal and economic ties
with the Arab world, and his own evolving friendship with the Egyptian
leader Gamal Abdul Nasser.
The domestic dimension has perhaps been the most important fac-
tor in shaping India’s understanding of the Jewish history and po liti cal
struggle. While the Pakistan factor has received considerable attention
internally, the domestic dimension still remains taboo. There are hon-
orable exceptions, such as Appadorai, but for the most part mainstream
scholars carefully avoided and still avoid discussing the infl uence of the
domestic Muslim population upon India’s Israel policy. Such an in-
quiry was dismissed as communalization, partisanship, or as being
part of a right- wing agenda. It never occurred to them that the foreign
policy of a democracy is a function of its domestic politics and that In-
dian Muslims have strong historic, cultural, and religious links with
the Middle East. The absence of dispassionate debate regarding the do-
mestic inputs into India’s Middle East policy remains a major chal-
lenge. This is further compounded by India’s policy of not releasing
offi cial papers pertaining to even Nehru’s tenure as prime minister
(1947– 1964).