20 introductionpo liti cal calculations. As Nehru’s friendship with Gamal Abdul Nasser
grew, India became less friendly toward Israel. At Bandung, Nehru ac-
cepted the Arab veto over Israeli participation and a year later formally
ruled out diplomatic ties after witnessing Israel joining hands with the
old imperial powers against a fellow member of the Afro- Asian world.
Gradually, India’s foreign policy acquired a distinct pro- Soviet bias,
and this in turn aff ected Israel’s fortunes. Nehru was vehemently criti-
cal of the Suez crisis but treated the Soviet invasion of Hungary a few
days later as an “internal” aff air of the Eastern Eu ro pe an bloc. Indian
reactions to the Czech crisis of 1968 and the Soviet invasion of Af ghan-
i stan in 1979 were also muted. While such a policy might have served
India’s vital interests, there was a secondary eff ect. Before long, the
Soviet Union became the “natural ally” of the nonaligned movement,
and this in turn contributed to the growing isolation of Israel in the
Third World. While the Soviet Union was not a factor in the formula-
tion of India’s policy, it off ered, especially after the June war, an ideo-
logical rationale. For many Third World countries, opposition to Israel
became a sign of “progressiveness.”
The international situation had an additional dimension: Arab useful-
ness over Kashmir. Having taken the Kashmir question to the United
Nations, Prime Minister Nehru and his successors needed all the inter-
national support they could muster. The pro- Pakistani sentiments in
some Western capitals and Pakistani membership in the U.S.- sponsored
anti- Soviet military blocs complicated the situation for India. Although
India’s closer friendship with the Soviet Union garnered Soviet veto
power in the UN Security Council, Pakistan became India’s major con-
cern in the Middle East. It sought to minimize and if possible counter
Pakistani infl uence through its pro- Arab policy.
Third, Nehru’s ideological worldview also worked against Israel. From
the early 1920s he infl uenced, guided, and eventually directed the foreign-
policy pronouncements of the Indian nationalists and subsequently of
the free India. His understanding of Jewish aspirations in Palestine nat-
urally became crucial to the formulation of his Israel policy. At one
level, he recognized the Jewish people as an ancient religious group that
had endured great suff ering and subjugation. At another level, he refused
to recognize them as a nation. Nehru’s endorsement of the right of subju-
gated people to freedom was never extended to the Jewish people. If the
Jews are not a nation, then he could not endorse their homeland project
in the Middle East. Thus ignoring the par tic u lar historic circumstances,